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Abstract 
Accession negotiations to the EU since 2004 brought significant changes to European 
enlargement customary law and exacerbated the reliance of the Commission on conditionality to 
impose its leverage on present and prospective member states. The subsequent development of 
European norms in the pre-accession phase was transposed onto current member states and led to 
the edification of a Normative Empire. This research reformulated the concept of Normative 
Empire while resting on factual and contemporary evidence. It investigated why the increasingly 
significant role in conditionality of the principle of independence of the judiciary contributed to 
the metamorphosis of the EU into a Normative Empire. The argumentation of this research 
rested on the study of Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania. In addition to their geographical kinship, 
these three cases share issues of rampant corruption, notably in the political and judicial 
structures, which remain the main obstacles to their accession or full membership. The analysis 
of the Commission’s influence in judicial reforms during the pre and post-accession phases was 
supported by a thorough study of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism and the progress 
reports from 2004 till present. In conclusion, the Commission’s post-accession monitoring in 
Bulgaria and Romania and the accession negotiations in Croatia led to a redefinition of the 
European norms and strengthened the Commission’s authority on normative matters. Moreover, 
the CVM assumes the possible establishment of an obligatory passage through a transitory phase 
for the future acceding members until recognised full compatibility with the European norms. 
The expansion of the EU’s normative platform increased the potential for intervention of the 
Commission in state governance. The case of transposition of the principle of independence of 
the judiciary onto Bulgaria and Romania demonstrated the aspirations of the Commission to 
enlarge and administer the EU through the systematic use of norms.  
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Jednání o přistoupení k EU od roku 2004 přinesl významné změny do rozšíření Evropské 
zvykového práva a zvýšeníl závislost Komisi o podmíněnosti při uložit jejich vliv na současné i 
budoucí členské státy. Následný vývoj evropských normy v pre-vstupní fáze byla provedena na 
stávajících členských státech a vedl k povznesení Normativní Říše. Tento výzkum přeformuloval 
pojem Normativní současné říše v literatuře, zatímco odpočívá na věcné a současný důkaz. 
Výzkum se zabýval, proč se stále významnější roli v podmíněnosti principu nezávislosti 
soudnictví přispěl k metamorfóze EU do Říše Normativní. Argumentace tohoto výzkumu se 
opírala o studium Bulharska, Chorvatska a Rumunska. Kromě své geografické příbuznosti, 
těchto třech případech podíl otázky bující korupci, zejména v politické a soudní struktury, které 
zůstaly z hlavních překážek jejich přístupu nebo plné členství.  
Analýza vlivu Komise v oblasti soudní reformy během pre a post-vstupu fáze byla podporována 
důkladnou studii o mechanismus spolupráce a ověřování a zprávy o pokroku z roku 2004 až po 
současnost. Na závěr, Komise po přistoupení-monitoring v Bulharsku a Rumunsku, a jednání o 
přistoupení v Chorvatsku vedla k redefinici evropských norem a posílila Komise orgánu o 
normativní otázky.  
Kromě toho, že CVM předpokládá případné vytvoření povinného průjezdu přechodné fázi 
budoucích přistupujících členů, dokud nebude uznána plná kompatibilita s evropskými normami.  
Rozšíření EU normativní platforma zvyšuje možnosti zásahu Komise v řízení státu.  
V případě provedení zásady nezávislosti soudní moci na Bulharsko a Rumunsko demonstroval 
úsilí Komise pro zvětšení a spravovat EU prostřednictvím systematické používání norem 
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Organisation of the Judiciary in Bulgaria, Croatia and 
Romania 
 
Bulgaria:  
Supreme Administrative Court and Supreme Court of Cassation 
Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) 
 -Inspectorate to the SJC 
 - National Institute of Justice  
Prosecutor Office 
National Security Agency: in charge of investigating high-level corruption and organised crime.  
  
Croatia:  
Supreme Court 
State Judicial Council (SJC) 
- Disciplinary Council 
- Judicial inspectorate 
- Judicial Academy 
State Prosecutor Council 
Prosecutor Office 
USKOK: anti-corruption unit 
National Council for Anti-corruption 
Committee for the prevention of Conflicts of Interest 
 
Romania: 
High Court of Cassation and Justice (HCCJ) 
- Prosecutor Office 
Superior Council of Magistracy (CSM) 
- National Institute for Magistracy (NIM) 
- National School for clerks 
National Integrity Agency (ANI) 
National Anti-corruption Directorate 
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The only stable state is the one in which all men are equal before the law.  
-- Aristotle (384-322 BC) 
 
 
he European Union recalls the multi-cephalous mythical creatures of antiquity. It remains 
a mysterious entity for its citizens and the complexity of its internal organisation an 
interrogation for scholars. The Union has become the trendy subject for testing a 
multitude of experimental models and this study is no exception to the rule.  
A nova of definitions and theories has attempted to define the EU in a tailor-made 
conceptual framework, the most renown being Moravcsik’s Liberal Intergovernmentalism or the 
theories of European integration Historical and Sociological Institutionalism1; yet, no satisfying 
terminology has pinpointed the exact nature of this overarching institution in perpetual 
movement. Each consecutive enlargement adds a particular shade of colour to the existing 
patchwork therefore refuting past theories. As each additional growth spurt distances the union 
from its original ancestor dating back to 1957, nothing is more natural but the attempt to 
understand the contemporary nature of the EU and the ongoing evolution of its power.   
 The traditional literature on the EU is still largely alimented by a debate between 
intergovernmentalists, federalists, and unitarists. The theories advocated by these three schools 
look into the layout of the constituent member states and fail to encompass the deep changes 
brought to the core of the EU by the eastern enlargements.  Yet, more recent theories have 
brought new insights on this topic and understand the EU as an entity evolving through 
enlargement and whose leverage reaches outside its physical borders; one of the most convincing 
theoretical analyses associates the EU with the idea of Empire.  
                                                          
1
 Ober, A. in Bache, Ian and Stephen George. Politics of the European Union; Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2nd Ed. ,2006, pp. 1-77.  
T 
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 The concept of European Empire rises as a direct response to the enlargements in Central 
and Eastern Europe (further: CEE). The works by Zielonka draw a polycentric political 
organisation for the EU in reaction to the increasing diversification of its member states.  The 
relations between the centre and the periphery transposed in this context allow the periphery into 
the decision-making circle in exchange for constrained sovereignty. The main means of control 
of the centre -- the EU bodies -- remain economic and bureaucratic. A more progressive theory 
developed by Laïdi pictures the EU as a normative empire, an entity imposing its power by 
setting internal and external norms, especially in the economic sphere and with regards to the 
entrance to the common European market.  
 The aforementioned theories touch upon the imperial side of enlargement, still relatively 
unexplored, and the political aspect of normative weight when regulating internal and external 
European affairs. In line with this, the concept of Normative Empire will be developed and 
redefined throughout this study, in order to demonstrate the normative power exerted by the 
European bodies and the European Commission in particular, in the processes of administrating 
and enlarging the European Union’s Empire.  
 This concept is two-fold and attributes different constrains depending on whether the 
norms are applied to the administration or to the enlargement of the union. The administration of 
the Normative Empire relies on the legitimate priority of implementation of European norms 
over national ones. The European Commission (further: EC) plays a primordial role as the 
guardian of the founding treaties and is responsible for certifying the compatibility of European 
norms within the EU. The EC also constrains the member states in complying with a specific 
regulatory framework by devolving some sovereignty at the EU level and most particularly to the 
EC, being the only full time European body. This devolution of power endows the EC with the 
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necessary powers to maintain the normative balance of the EU by infiltrating areas under 
national governance and imposing pressure on the member states to keep their legislation in line 
with the treaties or the acquis. Although the EC leverage enjoys considerable legitimacy and 
success, the EC heavily depends on the willingness of the member states to comply with the 
EC’s pressures and guidance. 
 On the contrary, the leverage of the Commission is unilateral and indisputable during the 
accession negotiations and the enlargement process. The asymmetry of power between European 
bodies and the acceding state favours the EC and the imposition of changes with regards to the 
transfer and implementation of the acquis and the full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria. 
However, the failure to curb the spread and damages of corruption and organised crime in 
Bulgaria and Romania generated and increased the sentiment of enlargement fatigue in the EU, 
in particular amongst its western members. In addition, it underlined the lack of experience and 
professionalism of the EC to guarantee the compatibility of the member states acceding and its 
inefficiency to deal with tougher cases2. The facts point out towards a different interpretation: 
since the first enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe in 2004, accession has been 
characterised by an incremental instrumentalisation of the use of conditionality. Croatia is now 
undergoing a thorough examination of the compatibility of its national norms with the EU 
legislation and is strictly monitored by the EC in the implementation of the acquis. The extensive 
use of conditionality by the EC in Croatia aims at reassuring the old member states of its ability 
to protect the EU from the accession of unprepared and incompatible candidates. Enlarging the 
EU to the Balkans is a major challenge for the European institutions and its outcome could result 
in either a historic success or fatal failure.  
                                                          
2
 Kochenov Dimitry, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality: Pre-accession Conditionality in 
the Fields of Democracy and the Rule of Law, Kluwer Law International European Monographs, New 
York, 2008, p. 51.  
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 The structure of the Normative Empire is erected on the mutation over time of the 
inclusive norms at the very basis of the EU. The EU is a normative entity by essence3, as only 
norms can replace the binding force of a European demos between the members. As a 
consequence, norms are enshrined in all the founding treaties and have becomes inherent features 
of the EU.  
 The first enlargements on the path to the present EU -- starting from the ECSC and the 
European Communities-- were based on sentiments of common inheritance, share of 
geographical proximity and democracy and on a somewhat recognisable European identity. The 
member states were in full control of the enlargement process and accession bore then the 
overtone of inclusion, based on the feeling of legitimate belonging to a certain group sharing 
common inherited features. These inclusive norms still define the union and have been 
transposed into article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union.   
 Norms of accession ceased to be inclusive with the enlargement in 2004 and with the 
entrance of states geographically, politically, economically and culturally different from one 
another and from the older members. The accession of post-soviet states advertised as the long-
awaited return to Europe did not conceal the concerns of the existing members, which put an end 
to the reliance of common identity and values as a road map for enlargement. Inclusive norms 
were replaced by exclusive norms, closer to rules than to values. The instauration of the 
Copenhagen criteria in 1993 represents the first step in this direction; the candidate to European 
membership must now comply with a list of predetermined criteria and the ever deepening 
                                                          
3
 Bretherton Charlotte and John Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, 2nd , Routledge Taylor 
and Francis Group, London and New York, 2006, p. 37.  
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harmonization and expansion of European legislation.  The EU has thus become more legalistic 
and uses norms as barrier for incompatible candidates4.  
 Moreover, the use of norms goes beyond the formal application ascribed in the treaties 
and touch upon a growing number of areas in a narrower fashion, as for instance in the economic 
readiness or the independence of the judiciary in the acceding and existing member states.  
 
 The present work will focus on the importance of the independence of the judiciary in 
European conditionality. This is a topical theme especially since the 2007 enlargement and an 
appropriate example of administrating and enlarging through the use of exclusive norms. The 
necessity for the member states to guarantee the independence of the judiciary was first 
mentioned discreetly under the Rule of Law section in the political criterion of the Copenhagen 
criteria. It gained importance over time and became a section in itself before being included in a 
dedicated chapter with its own subsections in the most recent progress reports for Croatia. The 
priority set by the EC to establish an independent judiciary in Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and in 
the whole of the western Balkans triggered the evolution and sophistication of European norms 
with regards to the independence of the judiciary. This elaboration is visible through the efforts 
of the EC to define and revise its definition of the independence of the judiciary, by spelling its 
key features, by defining European standards in this matter, by monitoring the reform process 
and by overlooking the conduct of judicial affairs within the states. The introduction of the 
independence of the judiciary as a criterion for complete European membership upon accession 
and to a certain extent for the existing member states, demonstrates the exclusive character of 
European norms and the increasing reliance of the EU on the aforementioned norms.    
 
                                                          
4
 Kochenov, D., 2008, p. 53.  
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 This dissertation is based on qualitative researches and develops the concept of 
Normative Empire by relying on the study of the evolution of accession conditionality to the EU. 
The methodology draws upon a literature review of the related theories in academia and on an 
extensive analysis of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism reports  (further: CVM) --
mechanism designed to monitor the establishment of an independent judiciary after accession-- 
(2007-present) and the Progress reports (2004-present) published by the European Commission.  
The bottom argumentative line of the dissertation aims at demonstrating that the EU 
qualifies as a Normative Empire for it administers its members and enlarges through the use of 
norms. Norms are here defined in a narrower, exclusive, more legalistic fashion and cover a 
greater scope than the norms usually associated with the EU in Art 6 of TEU (human rights, 
democracy and so on). The research is also a case study of the building of an independent 
judiciary in Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia. Subsequently, the idea of Normative Empire will be 
tested against the judicial reforms undertaken in the aforementioned three states. It is expected 
that the convergence between pre and post-accession phases will increase the leverage of the 
Commission in all normative areas of European affairs. The results of this research come at a 
very critical moment for the rest of the Balkans and set the possibility for the establishment of a 
permanent transitory phase after accession. Enlargement is on its way to become a laboratory for 
norms.  
 
These three cases are representative examples demonstrating the evolution of 
conditionality and the increasing role of the Commission in imposing reforms in the pre and post 
accession period. Romania and Bulgaria are the newest member states and thus, account for the 
latest evolutionary changes in conditionality. These early findings must be studied in line with 
14 
 
the ongoing accession negotiations in Croatia and together they draw a picture of systematic use 
and reliance on conditionality in the enlargement process. In addition to their geographical 
kinship, these three cases share some structural features: the rampant corruption as the main 
obstacle for their accession. One of the most efficient manners to curb this problem is by 
guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary and by enabling it with the sufficient capabilities 
and powers to check on the branches of power and the societal strata. The study of the 
independence of the judiciary -- the space dedicated in the application of conditionality and the 
accession negotiations -- will delimit the power of the Normative Empire in pre and post-
accession when dealing with issues similar in scope.  
 
 The structure of the chapters will address the following themes in this order. The first 
chapter will provide a more extensive introduction to the topic of the research. It will cover the 
enlargement process in the Balkans and demonstrate the normative attachment of the European 
Commission to the accession of Croatia. A discussion of the respective theories of Laïdi and 
Zielonka will follow next. Their arguments will be reviewed and will serve as a necessary basis 
to understand the concept of Normative Empire and its shortcomings as it stands. The legalistic 
weight of European norms will be restated further in this chapter and the mutation of norms will 
be illustrated by the debate stirred by the enlargement of the Schengen zone to Bulgaria and 
Romania, and the ongoing uproar against the Hungarian media law.  
 The second chapter will present a revised form of the concept of Normative Empire: its 
structure and internal functioning, the role of the European Commission behind the systematic 
use of regulatory and structural norms, and the administrating and enlarging scope of the Empire.  
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 The last chapter will demonstrate the existence of this Normative Empire in the 
establishment of an independent judiciary in Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia. The first subsection 
will study the space devoted to the independence of judiciary over time, the sophistication of the 
formulation of EU standards on this matter and the evolutionary concordance between the 
Cooperation & Verification Mechanism and the accession negotiations in Croatia. The second 
subsection will focus on the incremental changes in implementation of the recommendations and 
on the detail of the instrumentalisation of conditionality. The last subsection will discuss the 
successes and shortcomings of the strategies adopted by the EU as a Normative Empire when 
administrating and enlarging the union.    
 
 This research presents several points of academic interest. The concept of Normative 
Empire is a basis for re-conceptualisation of the European Union, its role, its power, its limits 
and its potential in administrating an enlarging union with a growing range of discrepancies. The 
role of the European Commission is here redefined and should be taken as a basis for 
understanding the enlargement process and for making the enlargement process more secure for 
the EU. Finally, the study highlights a reorientation of European policy towards a heavier 
reliance of the European institutions on legalistic norms and laws in order to penetrate into areas 
traditionally under strict national governance and to maintain a normative equilibrium in the 
union. This equilibrium is fragile and the most important constituent feature of the EU. The 
evolution of the EU into a Normative Empire is not motivated by colonial instincts but rather by 
efforts to maintain a functioning union between states different in many aspects.  
 
 
16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part I: Definition of the topic 
 
The first chapter touches upon different ontological areas in order to acclimatise the reader to the 
topic. It will thus underline the necessity of the enlargement of the European Union in the 
Balkans, interpret the academic conversation between Laïdi and Zielonka on the Normative 
Empire and will define the scope of the European norms.   
 
1) EU’s gourmandise in the Balkans 
a) An unpopular prospective 
 
The EU’s appetite for the inclusion of the Balkans in the union brings many of its constituent 
members close to indigestion. Hence, the arguments opposing the accession of Croatia or of any 
more Balkan country are views that deserve to be presented in order to set the decor in which the 
present accession negotiations are taking place. These arguments are two-fold: first, they relate 
17 
 
to the insecure political, economic and social atmosphere in the region and secondly, they reflect 
the general enlargement fatigue resented amongst the old member states and in the institutions.  
 The Balkans is renowned for its difficult history: bearing the title of powder keg of 
Europe a century ago, the consecutive Balkan wars, the lack of unification amongst its leaders, 
the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo and its dramatic 
consequences, up to the Yugoslavian wars, the region is scared by its history. In this context, 
unresolved interethnic tensions stand against the principle of transnational cooperation 
established in the EU. Rampant corruption, organised crime, arms, drugs and human trades 5pose 
major issues to the integration of the region in the union. The EU heavily depends on the health 
of the political, economic and social system of its members; consequently, allowing the 
accession of states with these kinds of unsolved issues would open the gate to a Trojan horse, 
corrupting the EU from inside.   
 The aforementioned regional particularities feed in a greater source of opposition to the 
enlargement of the EU in general and in the Balkans: the fatigue of the member states6. The 
accession of Bulgaria and Romania and the current issues of corruption and organised crime left 
damaging impressions on the integration of Balkan states and demonstrated the inability of the 
EU to protect the union from unprepared candidates. Moreover, the political motivations behind 
the 2007 enlargement are highly criticised, as the resulting derogated accession fostered 
instability7 in the EU, encouraged distrust between the older and newer member states and the 
preservation of sleeper cells of corruption and organised crime within its borders slowed down 
the development of the union.  
                                                          
5
 Bugajski Janusz, ‘Facing the Future: The Balkans to the Year 2010’, Center for European Integration 
Studies, 2001, pp. 3-4. 
6
 Hillion. C. in Graig& de Burca, 2011, pp. 200. 
7
 Schimmelfennig Frank, ‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern 
Enlargement of the European Union’, International Organization, 55:1, 2001, p. 71. 
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 In addition, there is the general reticence to expand the union to more hostile and 
underdeveloped regions whose integration would result in heavier costs for the EU notably for 
the richer member states to build a state administration compatible with European legislation and 
impose a mode of governance guaranteeing future economic benefits and contributions to the 
union. Moreover, the member states are unwilling to take such risks when all attention is now 
focused on maintaining or re-establishing economic growth and the economic protection of the 
national citizens in the present context of post-economic crisis. As a consequence, there is an 
increasing support for settling EU’s borders8, demonstrating again the reluctance to consider 
seriously new enlargements. The last point is built on the technical difficulty to manage a union 
representing a broad scope of different national interests and the belief is maintained that the EU 
is close to its maximal capacity.  
 
b) An impossible exclusion 
 
 Despite the aforementioned reasoning, the definitive exclusion of the Balkans from the 
EU is unthinkable or rather its inclusion is inevitable according to the normative nature of the 
EU. On this basis, the following arguments advocating the necessity to extend European 
membership to the Balkans rests on the prevalence of the common European identity over the 
opposing individual preferences of the member states9.      
 The value basis of the EU puts common norms and principles at the heart of the European 
political decisions and leading thus according to Schimmelfennig to a rhetorical entrapment 
                                                          
8
 Bretherton., C &J. Vogler, 2006, pp. 53.  
9
 Schimmelfennig. F., 2001, pp. 72. 
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fuelling the enlargement process10. The European founding values can be summed up as ensuring 
and protecting peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, the respect for human rights and to a 
certain extent fostering social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good 
governance11. The superiority and legitimacy of these norms is recognised by all member states 
and their adoption and respect are fundamental requirements for membership. As a consequence, 
together, they form the core elements of European identity12. The active promotion of these 
norms 13outside the European borders embodies an additional particularity of the role of norms in 
the EU. Exportation of norms is highly visible in the accession negotiations, but also in the 
financial aid conditionality with third party countries and the stance of the EU as a normative 
champion on the international arena especially in area related to environment protection: global 
warming and reduction of productions of dioxide of carbon account for the most famous 
struggles in this area.  
 Normative proximity or compatibility constitute a crucial asset for a successful candidacy 
to European membership and make the task difficult for the member states to advance refuting 
arguments against the accession of a new member state, as even self-interested attitudes must 
comply with some normative legitimacy14. As a matter of facts, the Treaty of the European 
Union suggests that a European state fulfilling the criteria of common values and European 
identity can apply and be considered eligible for membership15. The EU holds thus the same 
responsibilities and obligations towards the Balkans to commit to the founding norms as she did 
by accepting Central European claims for membership on the basis of a return to Europe and the 
                                                          
10
 Ibid., pp.17.  
11
 Manners in Bretherton., C &J. Vogler, 2006, pp. 37. 
12
 Ibid., pp. 37, 42.  
13
 Ibid., pp. 56, 60. & Schimmelfennig. F., 2001, pp. 16.  
14
 Schimmelfennig, F, 2001, p. 128 
15
 Manners in Bretherton., C &J. Vogler, 2006, p. 50.  
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share of common values16. Accordingly, the EU is entrapped in a dynamic of including states 
whose identity corresponds with the European common norms and is condemned to carry the 
enlargement process to its fullest if it remains committed to its normative structure17.      
 The actual delimitation of the areas eligible for European membership on a normative 
basis is difficult to determine, however, the Balkans conversely to farther regions are logically to 
be inserted into the union, allowing a smooth continuity of the European borders. Firstly, besides 
the geographical logic to establish a continuous domination of the EU over this relatively small 
area18, the Balkans is a cumbersome enclave in the south-east of the EU. Neglecting the Balkan 
states would only foster the concentration of criminality, corruption and illegal immigration on 
the border of the EU and along the borders of consolidating member states (Romania and 
Bulgaria) and would create a zone of instability that could endanger the internal balance of the 
EU in the long-run. European membership to the Balkans and the imposition of pre-accession 
reforms would fasten the cleansing of criminality under all its forms from the region and would 
increase stability and security in the EU19. Furthermore, the Balkans as a safe zone holds a non-
negligible potential to become a secure energy supply channel to the EU20.  
 Secondly, the Balkans represents a daring challenge holding big promises for the 
projection of EU’s power on adjacent regions and for the recognition of its international 
leverage. Its successes in CEE comforted it in its role of regional actor capable of managing its 
borders and maintaining security within its borders and strengthened its incentives to carry a 
                                                          
16
 Schimmelfennig Frank, ‘EU political accession conditionality after the 2004 enlargement: consistency 
and effectiveness’, Journal of European Public Policy, 15:6, 2008, pp. 120-1.  
17
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similar reform process to the Balkans21.  The asymmetrical power of the EU over the candidate 
state guarantees the accountability of the state to the EU and its compliance with reforming 
measures. The Balkans represents a tough credibility test for the EU as powerful international 
actor22 relying exclusively on the use of norms. Although Croatia’s accession in the near future is 
an encouraging start and could inspire other Balkan states to follow the same path, the region is 
constituted of weak states23 and the bulk is still far away from being considered as potential 
candidates24.  
 
 The above arguments help understanding the broad context of enlargement in the 
Balkans, as well as the advantages and concerns it raises. Subsequently, the next chapters will 
demonstrate how the EU aims at responding to the challenges posed by the inherent regional 
discrepancies by strengthening its normative power onto the region and by addressing issues 
such as corruption and criminality.  
 
 
2) The Normative Empire in the literature 
 
Few works expose in detail the concept of Normative Empire as such; Zielonka’s works are only 
partly related to this topic and Laïdi’s understanding of the normative empire applies to the 
hegemonic power of European market legislation rather than to the European leverage in 
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managing its internal and external politics. Both authors contribute to understanding the EU in a 
different yet complementary manner by focusing in turn on the imperial structure of the EU and 
the weight of norms in political decisions. A discussion of their conceptions will introduce the 
idea of Normative Empire that will be developed in the second chapter.  
 
The structure and the nature of the empires is the first point of dispute between the two 
authors studied. Zielonka defines Europe as neo-medieval empire characterised by the 
arrangement of a heterogeneous population in a polycentric political system whose borders 
between the core and the periphery are porous and faded. The heterogeneity of the populations 
leaves way to the emergence of different legal systems and scopes of citizen rights, distinct army 
and police institutions, as well as economic and social disparities between the regions25. The 
concept of empire here retraces the present state of the EU by focusing the amalgam of different 
population under a weak encompassing imperial ruling structure leaving much power in the 
hands of the periphery (non-European institutions). The polycentric organisation divides the 
decision-making power and European authority along different functional spheres, as it is 
already done at the Council of Ministers and at the Commission levels between the different 
directorates: judiciary, environment, competition and so on. Conversely, no specific structure of 
the EU occupies Laïdi’s thesis.  
 The empire has a two-ward focus: an internal concentration for Zielonka and an external 
focal point. Zielonka’s empire exerts disparate pressures on the member states depending on its 
control over each functional area. The presence of the EU’s oversight in all sectors is not 
motivated by the desire to constrain the member states but rather to maintain the cohesion within 
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the union. European neo-medieval empire is peculiar in the fact that it provides to rather than 
exploits the periphery26. As a consequence to this inward logic, the EU’s influence over the 
external environment and the neighbouring regions aims at building stability and security for the 
EU27. The same concerns for stability and security are present in Laïdi’s theory, however, with 
the exception that the EU’s external influence is the core pillar of the normative empire. In this 
context, European imperial approach is outward looking and refers to the European imposition 
and exportation of its norms, standards and rules to external players28, such as for instance, trade 
barriers for foreign goods to enter the common market.   
 These two visions provide complementary aspects, yet as it has been demonstrated, alone 
they fail to develop and analyse the full scope of European action. Laïdi does not provide 
insights on the internal structure of its empire, whereas, Zielonka does not provide explanations 
concerning a binding force between the regions that could make up for the erosion of 
sovereignty.  
   The respective works are diametrically opposed with regards to the organisation of 
power. The polycentric decision-making structure recalls the system of multi-level of governance 
according to which the authority of European leverage fluctuates between the territorial divisions 
and the area of governance29. The European institutions headed by the European Council 30form 
the core of Zielonka’s empire and represent a soft European emperor, as the natural 
fragmentations of European regions and the diffuse character of the European public space 
including the weakness of supranational level of decision-making reinforce the use of indirect 
democracy in European institutions in order to maintain control and cohesion over the EU and its 
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public space31. European institutions also play a key role in Laïdi’s conception but remain 
subordinated to the authority of the member states in concordance with intergovernmentalists’ 
views. The institutions’ crucial role lies in the power of constructing and legitimising European 
norms32 used to guide the relations between the member states and external actors.  
 As a consequence, although Zielonka underlines better the intrinsic and fluctuating power 
relations between the European institutions and the member states, he does not explore the 
reasons behind the devolution of power from the states to the institutions and the tools used by 
these institutions to administer internal affairs. Possible tools could refer for instance to the 
application of European norms (not solely values, but also laws) onto the management of internal 
and external affairs, as suggested by Laïdi.  
 National state sovereignty is considered as an obstacle by both theories and its erosion in 
favour of devolution of power to the European level is necessary and inevitable. Zielonka 
emphasizes the interlinked power relations between the member states and the European 
institutions: despite the overall superiority of the EU as a supranational entity over its constituent 
members, the states retain enough room of manoeuvre to keep the upper hand in certain areas33 
such as defence and education. This is the particular point that Laïdi addresses as the main 
obstacle to the development of the EU into a full-fledged normative empire. National sovereignty 
encourages self-interested behaviours that inherently undermine the development of European 
community causing a decrease in inter-states cooperation, giving way to an economic brake-
down and closed borders. The pursuit of national interests leads to unproductive attitudes and 
breeds unpredictability and conflict34. 
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Nevertheless, issues related to national sovereignty seem to lose momentum in European 
decision-making, as Western Europe already conceded in privileging economic interdependence 
over sovereignty and conditionality for European membership eroded the newly re-acquired 
sovereignty of Central and Eastern European states. Conditionality is here described as a potent 
tool eroding the basis for sovereignty and discouraging self-interested attitudes before acceding 
to the level of European decision-making. As Zielonka interprets it, conditionality is ‘the willing 
imposition of norms on states with the illusion of self-determination’35. Laïdi adds a subtlety to 
this interpretation by endowing norms with the ability to establish the supremacy of European 
rules over national ones and thus to bypass national sovereignty without threatening it 
completely and guaranteeing the support of the member states in the implementation of EU 
law36. The author also raises an interesting question that will not be explored in this research 
concerning the contradiction between the efforts of the EU to downgrade sovereignty for more 
devolution of power and its attempts to acquire state attributes as a way to increase the credibility 
of its international leverage37.   
 European preferences and aspirations are characterised by a pursuit of stability and 
security for the EU through the maintenance of EU’s asymmetrical power over the states and 
increasing reliance on norms for Laïdi. Security and stability on European borders is built 
through economic integration and soft conflict prevention38. The EU takes on the role of 
mediator in Laïdi’s opinion in order to refrain from dominating directly the external 
environment39, which would then involve the use of non-civilian measures and force. 
Subsequently, the maintenance of a security buffer on the outskirt of the EU will condemn the 
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EU to enlarge perpetually, as the every enlargement pushes back the European borders towards 
increasingly instable areas40.  
 Both concepts rely on EU’s asymmetrical power over the member states and abroad in 
order impose European authority, European norms and standards necessary to the construction of 
the aforementioned security buffer. However, reliance on asymmetrical power to support 
European leverage could prove to be lethal for the existence of the Union as a whole. Zielonka 
fears unilateral decisions by the member states and their non-compliance to EU rules. The 
ambiguities of conditionality allowing manipulations by the candidates and the lack of grand 
project for the enlarged EU denote the lack of supervision by the European institutions and 
encourage discretionary implementation of European law41. Laïdi foresees the decline of 
European asymmetrical power upon the European involvement in areas where the EU does not 
hold the dominant geopolitical position42, especially with reference to eastern enlargements and 
its relations with Russia.  
 Laïdi attaches a particular importance to the role of norms in guiding foreign policy and 
as the only tool for international action. The EU is here assimilated with its feature of common 
interdependent market relying on norms countering self-interested behaviours slowing down 
cooperation and breeding unproductive instability. There is thus the general conviction to rely on 
the socializing strength of trade and on the export of European norms and economic 
interdependence abroad in order to maintain and create security and stability instead of betting 
on Realpolitik43. Norms modify the external environment: the imposition of European rules in 
order to access the European market and the consequent cohesion and stability around the 
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union44 are blatant evidence. Nevertheless, the author’s views are perhaps too restrictive, if only 
considering the access to the common market as the main nucleus for the spread of norms and 
the reform of the political and judiciary systems of neighbouring states. The imposition of norms 
externally remains discreet in this analysis and does not account for issues of non-compliance in 
areas disconnected to trade relations.   
 The perspectives about enlargement are divided along the same dialectic of inward and 
outward focus as previously mentioned. Zielonka understands the enlargement process as a 
civilian expansion of the Empire through sending invitations for membership and diplomatic 
bargain45, whereas, Laïdi argues that the attractiveness of the European market fuels the 
incentives of external actors to seek membership46. Enlargement is thus two-wards: a colonising 
entity whose membership is actively sought.  
 In both theories, conditionality is a key component to the unilateral projection of 
European power onto acceding states. According to Zielonka, conditionality reinforces European 
economic credibility and political legitimacy abroad and therefore constitutes an argument of 
force sustaining European involvement and political control over acceding members 47(only 
since 2004 enlargement). Laïdi adopts more liberal views and associates the coercion of 
candidate states to adopt and implement European (market) norms as part of the socializing force 
of trade and for the benefit of all parties48. Subsequently to these two views, conditionality is 
synonym of systematic imposition of norms having for purpose to shape the aspiring candidates 
into structures satisfying membership criteria.  
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 Further enlargement of the union means for both authors an eventual loss of authority and 
dislocation of power. The increase of differences and thus disparities in Zielonka’s opinion will 
lead to a greater diffusion and disorganisation of power because of the number and distance 
between members ruling the polycentric power structure. Widening will be then at the expense 
of the full implementation of EU law49. The lack of complete application of EU law is according 
to Laïdi due to the threat imposed by ever further developing and stricter rules/laws on national 
sovereignty. Reticence of the member states to abide to sovereignty infringing laws will lead to a 
fatal erosion of the supremacy of the normative empire. Deepening in his views is as much of a 
threat as incomplete widening, inasmuch as building a ring of cooperative states around the EU 
without prospective of membership would remove the incentives for the implementation of 
European norms50. Both views concord on the same conclusion: the EU is incapable of 
conducting dramatic further widening or deepening of the union without endangering its 
authority and survival.   
 
 The debate between Zielonka and Laïdi draws an overview of the structure and external 
power of the EU in its quality of normative/ empire, as it stands in the literature. In addition to 
the shortcomings pointed out throughout the discussion, it is important to keep in mind for later, 
their final conclusion about the inadequacy and inability of the EU to develop its power and 
administer the diversity of the union on EU law platform. The purpose of this research disagrees 
with this conclusion and will elaborate its argumentation in the second and third chapters.  
 
3) Mutation of Norms 
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a) Norms and the EU 
 
Norms are pivotal constituent elements in Laïdi’s work and have been defined in universal terms 
that can be used for the introduction of the mutation of European norms in this study. The spread 
of norms presents the following features: negotiation over imposition, legitimization by 
international bodies, enforceability on all actors disregarding their rank in the international 
system, identification of set standards and set objectives, and capacity to be observed over time. 
The use of norms aims at creating stable and predictable interactions between several actors and 
relies on the internalization and legitimization of these norms by all actors.  
 The reliance of the EU on norms intends to bind the member states around common 
principles and to foster cooperation without threatening national sovereignty directly. Norms 
prevent the emergence of zero-sum games and impose discipline in inter-state relations while 
reinforcing the domination of the European bodies. The EU’s commitment to norms and 
normative justification of its action enhance the European leverage internationally, unless its 
actions infringe national sovereignty in a region where the EU does not dominate the geopolitical 
situation.  
 Nevertheless, the scope of European norms goes beyond the market regulations and 
norms have evolved and formed over time a core pillar in European decision-making. This 
section will incorporate Laïdi’s definitions which provide further precisions on the nature and 
role of norms in the EU.  
 
 As previously mentioned the EU is a normative entity: norms have been used to shape a 
common European identity before representing an integral part of European decision-making. 
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European norms can be found in the preamble of most of the founding treaties and more 
concisely under the Article 6 of the TEU. The core principles of European identity rest thus on a 
common sharing of democracy, liberty, respect for human rights and individual/fundamental 
freedoms and the rule of law. Subsequently, values and norms have supplanted the absence of 
European demos and have become a substitute for identification with European common 
inheritance51.  
 The unequivocal commitment of the member states to these principles and their 
internalization constitute a strong binding force among the members and legitimize the 
devolution of power to the European bodies. This common normative practice also guides 
European civilian foreign policy (being deprived of a common armed force) which acts primarily 
through the exportation of its norms. The formula adopted by the EU in the Balkans to build 
security and stability in the region through principles of good governance demonstrates the EU’s 
commitment and reliance on norms52.  
 
b) From Inclusive to Exclusive 
 
The last enlargements waves have uncovered a peculiar dynamic in European norms, which have 
grown from inclusive to increasingly exclusive.  
 It has been highlighted that the early forms of the European Union have been built on a 
basis of inclusion and enlargements motivated (outside of the economic and political incentives) 
by feelings of common European identity, share of norms, values and democracy. This self-focus 
                                                          
51
 Bretherton., C &J. Vogler, 2006, pp. 38-40.  
52
 Rossi &Panebianco, 2004, pp. 13, 18. 
31 
 
reinforced the sentiment of belonging by juxtaposition to the definition of and distancing from 
the ‘others’, in the post-WWII context, the Communist Bloc.  
 This strategy of inclusive enlargement was disrupted by two factors: the incremental 
expansion of the corpus of EU law and the fall of the USSR.  The multiplication of EU law 
documents and the increasing place devoted to norms reinforced the weight of the European 
institutions over national states as supervisory organs. The consequent devolution of power to 
ensure the application of EU law across the Union led the states to eventually relinquish their 
control over the enlargement process to the European Council and more importantly to the 
European Commission, the only institution fully dedicated to European Affairs. The monitoring 
of the accession negotiations at the EU level became particularly visible after the fall of the 
communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and as the eventual accession of Central and 
Eastern Europe drew nearer. In a short time span between 1993 and 1995, the European 
institutions gained complete control over the monitoring of the pre-accession reforms and 
adopted a revolutionary attitude towards enlargement by introducing a broad range of normative 
tools. The year 1993 established the normative basis for the domination of the EU bodies over 
the membership negotiations and the infamous Copenhagen Criteria, then the Essen European 
Council in 1994 launched the first pre-accession strategy, and 1995 marked the peak of the 
reforms: first, the European Council in Madrid stipulated the political commitment to the 
implementation of the acquis and the reform of the administration to guarantee the 
implementation of the EU law as requirements for membership and secondly, the same year, the 
Commission launched its first reports on the application of the Copenhagen criteria and the pre-
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accession strategy to monitor and guide the reforms in CEE53. Conditionality to European 
membership was born.  
 Despite the claims of return to Europe connoted with inclusion from the Czech Republic 
and taken up by the rest of the CEE, the enlargement in 2004 was characterized by a swift turn to 
exclusive norms in accession negotiations. The introduction of the Copenhagen criteria and the 
use of conditionality aimed at restricting the entrance to the union to those that were compatible 
with the organization of this value-based community54. The instrumentalisation of conditionality, 
studied at a later stage, distinguished the accession procedure as process of how to become more 
European55.  
 The mutation of European norms did not end with the introduction of conditionality as 
the only procedure of accession, but also led to a reconfiguration of the role of norms in 
administrating European internal affairs. European norms undertook a legalistic transformation 
and moved away from their previous value basis. As a consequence, European norms in legal 
matters gained momentum and refined their standards. For instance, although no European 
definition of rule of law was officially published, the independence of the judiciary and the role 
of integrity agencies were stressed in the accession negotiations for Croatia and presently under 
the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism in Bulgaria and Romania.  
 Two recent debates in the European press illustrate the ongoing evolution of norms from 
value-centred to a greater reliance on legal aspects. The refusal from France and Germany to 
allow Bulgaria and Romania in the Schengen zone until the completion of the CVM 
demonstrates the concern of the European bodies and states to build a coherent legal system 
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resting on the rule of law. Moreover, there is no mention of the elements of the CVM 
benchmarks in the founding treaties besides the respect for the rule of law, hence, the recognition 
of the CVM and of its benchmarks by influent member states endows the soft mechanism with 
the responsibility and legitimacy to promote and monitor the implementation of European norms 
in the new member states and possibly to extend its role to further accessions. The CVM 
enhanced the importance of the judiciary in the EU and further defined the European judicial 
model. 
 The second event refers to the Hungarian law on the media which could have restrictive 
consequences on the freedom of expression in Hungary and a potential control of the media by 
the leading political party. The uproar throughout the EU amongst journalists taken up by several 
states called on the Commission to revise the law’s compatibility with the founding treaties. On 
this note, although freedom of expression is not explicitly mentioned in any treaty, the 
transnational mobilization around this issue of breach of liberty demonstrates the unofficial and 
de facto commitment of the EU to the individual freedoms and the separation of power.  
 
 The mutated norms are by essence exclusive. They call for the compliance with the 
European normative core and appeal to a much lesser extent to a vague European identity. 
Compliance here designates the rightful attitude in the EU and excludes the ones disobeying to 
European norms. These new norms are thus endowed with moral superiority recognized by the 
member states and the European citizens inasmuch as they aim at protecting the EU from threats 
to its prosperity, stability, security and survival56.  
The sophistication of European norms results in a positive increase of the EU’s 
international leverage and grants the Union with the title of norms hegemon. The EU’s 
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commitment to its normative essence augmented its credibility as a successful normative player; 
the twining programmes advocating the constructions of more efficient administration and 
judiciary, the specific funding programme for the Balkans imposing the respect of the rule of law 
as a requirement for access to the CARDS funds57 are examples of EU’s determination to rule 
with normative power.  
 
 
This first chapter has demonstrated the important scope of action of the concept of Normative 
Empire. The discussion between Laïdi and Zielonka isolated key features of this empire and 
simultaneously pointed out the weaknesses of the concept as it stands, though already analyzed 
from two distinct perspectives. The additional sections on the process of enlargement in the 
Balkans and the mutation of norms underline the key role of norms in European decision-making 
and formulating rules of guidance for the regulations of European affairs.  
  
 
Part II. The Normative Empire Redefined and Tested 
  
The second part of this study will be dedicated to the readjustment of the concept of Normative 
Empire. It will define its organisational structure and functioning depending on whether internal 
or external affairs of the EU are discussed. The central place accorded to the Commission in this 
normative model will unravel another salient feature of the theory. Its decisive role is envisaged 
to grow increasingly more powerful over the next years due to the visible reliance of the EU on 
normative power.  
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1) The Overarching Structure and Internal Organisation 
 
The structure of the Normative Empire rests on the precedent literature analysis and develops 
Zielonka’s multi-layered structure while elaborating on the role of norms in this structure. The 
theory here studied merges the opinions of these two authors in an innovative manner and 
refocuses the definition of the EU in line with its contemporary layout.   
 
a. Multi-layered structure 
 
The successive enlargement waves conglomerating diverse and distant states within a same 
organisation endowed the Union with an ad-hoc structure, fixing its institutions and organisation 
with each enlargement rather than re-building the whole system. The consequent diversification 
of its constituent parts enhanced the role of European institutions and the reliance by the latter on 
norms to administer the union and to interfere with legitimate means in the states’ area of 
governance.  
 The polycentric structure of Zielonka’s neo-medieval empire is inspired from the system 
of multi-level of governance and organises the division of power in functional areas of 
governance and along territorial layers. Nevertheless, the power division remains formal and 
does not qualify the power relations between the states and states’organs with the European 
institutions and the influence of each actor over the others.  
 A similar polycentric structure could be applied to the Normative Empire studied here, 
but such hypothesis will remain unexplored in this research because further explanation of this 
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hierarchal system only concerns the implementation of policies, legislation and is secondary to 
the purpose of this study. The relations between the states’ institutions and the European ones 
emanates from the researches as primordial evidences of the increasing power of European 
institutions.  
 Subsequently, the Normative Empire addresses three levels of analysis: European, state 
and institutional. The European Commission, as developed in the next section, occupies the top 
of this pyramidal structure because of its control over policy formation and oversight over every 
policy area. The states while retaining decision-making power, transfer and pool considerable 
authority at the European level, creating an interdependent relation between these two strata. The 
retrospective power relations blur the division between the core and the periphery to take 
Zielonka’s words.  
 However, interdependence does not make the exclusion of a state impossible. States 
should be thus compared to separate units forming a whole, the EU, and individually they can be 
isolated and to a certain extent dissociated from the group (rhetorically rather than practically) in 
case of non-compliance with European instructions jeopardising the EU as a whole. Similar logic 
is applied to intra-state institutions and state organs. Non-compliance of a state’s institution will 
have severe consequences for the state and will legitimise European interference in the state’s 
area of governance. The expansion of European leverage at the institutional level crosses the 
formal borders of state sovereignty and establish joint governance between the state and the 
European institutions over (some) national institutions. European governance and in particular of 
the European Commission in national institutions is visible through the work of reporting, policy 
monitoring, supervision of allocation of funds and twining projects.  
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 The evolution of the EU into a Normative Empire only became indisputable with the 
introduction of the Copenhagen criteria and the enlargement in 2004. The domination of the 
European institutions became more visible in the newest member states, as the European 
Commission started monitoring state reforms on the road to accession in Central and Eastern 
Europe. The tendency grew and Bulgaria and Romania were the first to be threatened of the use 
of safeguard clauses if progress on the implementation of European law did not gain momentum. 
The imposition of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism gave direct leverage to the 
European Commission on Bulgarian and Romanian judiciary and linked the states compliance 
with the European monitoring to the fate of their entrance in the Schengen zone. The increase of 
isolation sanctions and European monitoring in the new member states grew in comparison to the 
traditional infringement procedure applied on older members58 and as a consequence eroded the 
state’s monopoly on the governance of national institutions. The ongoing negotiations in Croatia 
illustrate the shift of power in favour of the European institutions operating since 2004. Until 
2004, the European Union through the European Commission would rely on the state to 
implement the necessary reforms. Since 2005 and more especially in the context of Croatian 
accession, the European Commission addresses direct instructions to the state’s institutions with 
regards to the implementation of the acquis and has developed its own monitoring system, 
meaning that it does no longer rely solely on reports emitted by the state to evaluate the progress 
of the negotiations.   
 In addition, the extension of conditionality to the CVM and the imposition of a transitory 
reform period for the new member states demonstrate the consolidation of the domination of the 
European institutions over states’ organs after accession, especially with regards to the 
application of common norms.  
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 Nonetheless, despite the increasing scope of governance of the EU, the union highly 
depends on the states and on their cooperation in supporting the pressures on the states 
institutions for the implementation of its policies. On a side note, the state’s chief strategy to 
retain sovereign power is non-compliance or discretionary implementation of policies rather than 
the actual modification of the policy at the European level.  
Moreover, further enlargements will reinvigorate states’ unilateral power vis-a-vis the 
EU. In spite of concerns foretold by the ideas of rhetorical entrapment and the threat of an 
everlasting enlargement process in the literature studied above, state control over enlargement in 
the long-run will put an end to the imperial expansion of the EU. Referred to as the unofficial 
fourth Copenhagen criteria, the report in 2006 of the European Commission on the capacity to 
integrate new member states stipulates that further enlargements will depend on the absorption 
capacity of the EU, the strength of its budget, the efficiency of its institutions and the full 
implementation of European policies within the existing union59. This instrument will provide 
reluctant members to further enlargement with the necessary arguments to put an end to 
enlargement.  
 
b. Regulatory and structural norms  
 
The European norms constitute the main source of power and leverage of the EU. However, as 
the strength of the European leverage adjusts itself whether it is exerted in the pre and post-
accession phases, the use and nature of norms varies accordingly.  
  The role of norms can be divided in two categories: structural during the pre-accession 
phase and regulatory upon accession. Structural norms refer to a larger extent to the norms 
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imposed in order to make the candidate state normatively compatible with the European 
legislation. The bulk of structural norms are enacted through conditionality. Norms with 
regulatory purpose unlike their structural counterparts do not aim at edifying new institutions and 
designate all European legislation common to the whole community.  
 Structural norms represent key elements in the process of becoming a member state. 
Conditionality is composed of the Copenhagen criteria and its related documents and the acquis 
communautaire. Conditionality embodies thus the essence of the union and concentrates the 
European norms in a single package. The political criterion under the Copenhagen criteria 
beholds perhaps the strongest normative authority, as it defines the core principles of the EU and 
thus the meaning of membership. These normative instruments aim at changing the political and 
economic organisation of the state in order to fit European expectations.  
 Conditionality fulfils the role of watchdog of the EU in a certain respect and is the point 
of reference for determining the readiness of a candidate for accession. However, the absence of 
a European model leaves the candidate state responsible for building an institutional layout 
compatible with the aforementioned criteria.  
 The EU loses part of its unconditional leverage over the state once the latter accedes to 
the status of member state and start participating in European decision-making.            
 
 
2) Dominance of the European Commission  
 
The irony in the empires covered in the literature section lies in the absence of emperor or any 
equivalent bureaucratic figure. Zielonka endows the European Council with European 
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leadership, because it reassembles all the European leaders under a same roof. This logic cannot 
apply to the Normative Empire, as only the European Commission can guarantee the formation 
and supervision of the implementation of European norms.   
 
a. Role of the European Commission 
 
The European Commission is undoubtedly the key actor in the Normative Empire because it is 
the only institution that deals directly with the enforcement of norms both during the pre and post 
accession phases.  
 The European Council was traditionally in charge of leading the enlargement process60 
and the member states could unilaterally determine the outcome of the negotiations by 
encouraging or by blocking the entrance of certain candidates61, France’s veto against British 
accession is a memorable illustration. The refinement of the accession process with the 
Copenhagen criteria shifted the decision-making power to the European Commission62. Criteria 
defining the progress of a given candidate towards accession require a fairly important time-
consuming monitoring and a level of supervision that the European Council could not undertake 
due to its lack of expertise in this area and time constrains. The European Commission was 
endowed with the daily management of the enlargement and with the responsibility to prepare 
drafts for the accession negotiations, to promote and supervise the implementation of the acquis, 
to define the direction of the reforms by preparing the criteria for opening or closing the chapters 
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and the possible application of sanctions63. Close monitoring of the conditionality gave rise to a 
sophistication of the norms at play, as accession defines also the gradual transfer of European 
identity through norms, common principles, mode of governance and legislation to another state. 
The Commission’s importance lies in its faculty to determine the course of implementation of the 
legislation highlighting in return what standards are valued by the EC and the EU and what is 
normatively compatible with the EU64. As a consequence for instance, the Commission imposed 
financial sanctions on Bulgaria and Romania as with regards to the access to pre-accession funds 
in 2008 (funds being part of the transition period these two member states are going though) 
based on a clause concerning the suspension of funds in case of shortcomings in democracy, 
respect for human rights and the Rule of Law65.  
 
 In addition to the overall domination by the European Commission of the pre-accession 
phase, the results of this research have pointed out towards the increasing leverage of the 
Commission to interfere directly at the level of sub-state institutions. Although the CVM 
constitutes a particular mechanism and is denominated as an extension of conditionality in the 
post-accession, it demonstrates the ability of this European organ to infiltrate, check and 
recommend directly to state judicial bodies, which belong exclusively to the state area of 
governance. Its ability to pronounce an opinion on the shortcomings and successes of the 
institutional work of the member states grants the Commission with the function of a 
transnational judge. The amplification and diversification of EU norms and standards in almost 
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all areas of expertise increases the surface accessible to European rule and to the Commission to 
impose its supervision.   
 
 Subsequently, the EC is comparable to a norm hegemon whose normative power 
stretches inside and outside the European borders. Norms originate in the Commission’s womb, 
as it sets the norm agenda for the EU and retains some final checking power before 
implementation. More importantly than the creation of European norms, it is the protection of 
their (mythical for some) existence. The Commission can impose sanctions against the member 
states for non-compliance with EU norms or breach of the founding treaties by filling an 
infringement procedure or applying the safeguard clauses. The ongoing revision of the 
Hungarian media law demonstrates the Commission’s power to revise the normative alignment 
throughout the EU. Laïdi’s outer perspective of the normative empire is reinforced with the 
imposition of compliance with the European norms inside the EU.  
 Nonetheless, the legitimacy of the Commission’s leverage is curtailed by its dependence 
on the devolution of power from the member states. Hence, the Commission can become in turn 
the instrument of the states by acting as a messenger between the institutions or between the 
member states. It can only fulfil its role of executive body and mediator when called upon by the 
states to regulate inter/intra state affairs. The example of the Hungarian law underlines the 
subordinate position of the Commission to the member states and the origin of its power in the 
trust accorded by the member states to take action against the infringement of presumed 
European norms.  
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The customary practice of imposition of EU norms has led on one hand to the self-identification 
of the union with these norms and on the other, to a visible effort to revise its administration of 
the EU. The CVM demonstrates the will of the Commission to promote actively the 
harmonisation of European norms among the member states and its proactive attitude in dealing 
directly with the institutions responsible for policy implementation within the state.  
 
b.  Enlarging and Administrating the EU 
 
Reliance on normative power constitutes the EU’s main preference for building security and 
stability within and outside the EU. The introduction of the CVM and the refusal this year to 
extend the Schengen zone to Bulgaria and Romania demonstrate the concerns of the EU on these 
matters. In addition, the successful previous enlargements and the construction of functioning 
systems of rule of law in candidate states for membership thanks to the introduction of 
conditionality have increased the international leverage and the credibility of the EU as a 
powerful normative actor, capable of managing its sphere of influence through civilian means.  
 This section bears the title ‘enlarging and administrating’ in reference to the main 
division of the EC’s normative power and related functions. Enlarging refers to the activities of 
the Commission in the pre-accession phase and administrating to regulating the acceptance of 
European norms by the member states. The role of administrator is a by-product of the 
convergence of enlargement norms with the post-accession phase and of the consequent 
adjustments operated in the area of European norms. The redefinition of European norms led to 
the diversification and a rethinking of the EC as the guardian of European norms. Protection is 
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thus supported in theory by an active monitoring and supervision of the implementation of these 
norms in existing member states.    
 
i) Path Dependent Projection of Power 
 
Projection of power is central in Zielonka and Laïdi’s understandings of European enlargement. 
Increasing EU’s external leverage is the only way to maintain secure borders for the EU. In this 
optic, the EU is obliged to enlarge rather than decides the direction of enlargement. 
Schimmelfennig examines enlargement through another lens and argues that the EU’s 
commitment to its normative core and the legacy of the previous enlargements have locked the 
EU into a rhetorical entrapment. The earlier enlargements in Central and Eastern Europe and the 
continuity of the Balkans with the European borders weaken any position against the accession 
of Croatia. Moreover, maintaining this regional enclave between Greece and Bulgaria contradict 
EU’s principle of encouraging the development of democracy and good governance. Both 
conceptions involve thus the idea of path dependency.    
 The increasing reliance on norms to guide the process of enlargement is compatible and 
benefits from this path dependency and possibly amplifies the phenomenon to a certain extent. 
Enlargement shall thus be studied under this light in order to respond to the concerns in the 
literature and to explain the positive consequences of path dependent decisions on the 
instrumentalisation of conditionality. The essence of norms is to create regular and systematic 
paths of action. Applied to enlargement they brought path dependent obligations for the 
formation of EU policy on this matter. Norms gave thus a rigid structure that is constantly 
evolving and adapting to the candidate state. This tendency will accelerate with the accession of 
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Croatia: further requirements for accession have already been introduced such as cooperation 
with the ICTY and fight against corruption and organised crime. These norms are expected to 
tighten as the negotiations progress in the western Balkans. The enlargement scheme applied to 
Central and Eastern Europe needs revision in order to counter the new issues posed by the 
candidacy of Balkan states. Croatia is providing a demonstration in vivo of the potential of 
adaptation of the enlargement policies.  
 Path dependency led to the evolution of norms in the context of enlargement and 
distinguishes itself by the redefinition of norms and the instrumentalisation of conditionality. 
As already mentioned, enlargement underwent a revolution with the introduction of 
conditionality and was no longer or to a lesser extent based on political considerations about 
regional identity or market proximity. Conditionality redefined the norms as exclusive and 
exclusionary. This normative instrument established criteria of eligibility for membership, gave a 
legal outer aspect to the accession negotiations by setting relatively clear benchmarks and 
procedure of accession. The difference with the use of conditionality lies in the underlying 
meaning of sending invitations and receiving applications for the same membership.  
 The potential for adaptation and flexibility of conditionality is the essential quality of this 
normative framework. Subsequently, these qualities enable the EU to keep its foreign policy in 
line with its internal policy and to adapt to the situation of the acceding country by emphasizing 
certain issues over others66 , for instance democracy and the rule of law. Flexibility also enables 
the member states to impose unilateral conditions on the accession of specific states, adding thus 
to the corpus of EU norms and to customary enlargement law. Croatia experienced such 
modifications of the core conditionality by the member states with the border issues raised by 
                                                          
66
 Borzel and van Hullen, 2011, p.11. 
46 
 
Slovenia and its required active cooperation with the ICTY67. Hence, there is a general 
correlation between the precision of the EU law and the rise of expectations towards the 
candidates. The earlier example of the rule of law as a precondition for the CARDS68 funds 
illustrates the tightening of EU’s expectations concerning the candidate’s abidance to EU law 
and norms. In addition, although Laïdi rests his argumentation on the attractiveness of the 
common market as a basis for norm formation and implementation, European membership 
involves many more duties than just economic restrictions and reaches out far beyond the 
economic sphere.   
 
ii) Instrumentalisation of Conditionality 
 
The instrumentalisation of conditionality is another main consequence of path dependent 
enlargement. Identification with European norms and professionalization of enlargement policy 
are the visible impacts of the systematic application of conditionality. Norms are studied in this 
paper as tools enhancing the EU’s leverage inside or outside its borders; however, their 
importance in forming a basis for a substitute of European identity deserves some attention. 
Hence, internalisation of the European norms results from the customary enlargement practice 
consisting in the systematic application of norms onto the candidate states. The repetitive 
presence of norms in policy anchors their weight as a legitimate tool for policy making and 
instrument for the transformation of acceding states69. 
 Conditionality would not be such a powerful normative tool without an adequate scheme 
of implementation. As a consequence, instrumentalisation is the most important aspect of 
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conditionality, as it determines the efficiency and professionalism of the enlargement process 
and of the EU in the long-term.      
     Each enlargement brings its modification to the scheme. The last years have seen the 
establishment of stages of accession, the division of the acquis into chapters (addition of Chapter 
23 on judicial affairs in 2005 designed for Croatian accession), the evolution of the criteria of 
evaluation and the overall increase of detail of the progress reports. Instrumentalisation enhances 
the credibility and the value of European membership in several ways. Tight control of the 
compliance of the candidate with the acquis guarantees the normative compatibility of the state 
with the existing setting of the EU and its ability to adapt to the evolution of the EU, hence 
curbing actively the concerns fuelling the enlargement fatigue among the older member states at 
the European Council level70. Furthermore, instrumentalisation provides an objective basis for 
determining the readiness of the candidate and accession is mostly based on technical 
compliance and achievements. The European Commission, with the approval of the European 
Council and to a lesser extent the European Parliament, can and has already exerted its power to 
postpone or refuse accession if these criteria are not completely fulfilled disregarding the 
calendar set for accession. Croatia’s accession was forecasted for the end of 2010 and has been 
postponed to 2012 due to lasting deficiencies in the judiciary and remaining efforts needed for 
curbing corruption. The danger looming over this objective accession procedure lies in the lack 
of objectivity of assessment; the EC will have to be careful in maintaining a clear line of 
evaluation and to refrain from the use of double standards of norms implementation, risking 
otherwise, like the Bulgarian and Romanian examples demonstrate, to undermine the credibility 
of the union and the effectiveness of transformation71.  
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 The evolution of the implementation of the acquis into a complicated scheme of 
accession had a positive effect on the bargaining power of the EC over the rest of the European 
institutions and the European Council in particular72. The EC became de facto responsible for the 
course of enlargement, as it guides, controls and supervises the implementation of conditionality. 
By acquiring control over conditionality, it has earned the licence to change the internal 
organisation of the candidate state and thanks to its normative supremacy to bypass state 
sovereignty. Such interference with state sovereignty was unthinkable before 2004.  
 Bulgarian and Romanian accessions attest the significance of conditionality in 
determining the readiness of the state to enter the union. As Trauner and this research argue, the 
CVM represents a prolongation of conditionality after accession and constitute a transitory phase 
between accession and full membership73. The constant monitoring since 2007, the prolongation 
of the CVM after the initial deadline in 2009 and its transformation into requirements for 
entering the Schengen zone have temporally placed Romania and Bulgaria in a zone of second 
class membership. The imposition of a transitory phase for these Member States means in effect 
the obligation to assist to the monitoring of their internal affairs by the Commission and the 
deprivation (though just formally) of enjoying the benefits of belonging to the Schengen zone.  
 The continuation between the instrumentalisation of conditionality and self-identification 
of the EU with the norms promulgated leads to the constant revision and reformulation of the EU 
norms. The consequent reliance on customary practice to direct enlargement and the expansion 
of the EU norms corpus qualifies the accession procedure as a process of acquisition of European 
membership. As the use of norms gains momentum in enlargement policy, the future 
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enlargements will be characterized by the construction of the meaning European membership74, 
the Ariadne’s thread of the accession negotiations.      
 
iii) Power asymmetry, a European sword of Damocles  
 
 Two additional factors stemming from the analysis of Zielonka and Laïdi’ works remain 
to be addressed in order to clarify the scope of action of the Commission in the administration of 
the Normative Empire: the double-edged sword of asymmetrical power relationship and state 
sovereignty.  
 Asymmetrical domination of the European institutions over the member states is inherent 
to the definition of empire. However, the two authors studied above associate the European quest 
for international leverage and domination of its neighbouring regions by relying on relationships’ 
asymmetries with a dynamic of perpetual and fatal enlargement. This dynamic is reinforced by 
the decrease of supranational authority over the member states after accession strengthening thus 
inexorably the compulsion to seek leverage outside of the EU. This research argues the contrary.  
It is unconceivable for an entity with such a sophisticated institutional structure to rely 
solely on its pre-accession leverage to sustain the functioning of the union in the long-term. 
Hence, the deterministic approach to EU’s asymmetrical leverage used only in the enlargement 
settings is too narrow; instead, a relative decrease of authority of the European Commission over 
the member states due to a revival of sovereignty after accession is more appropriate to define 
the power relations within the EU.   
Norms play an essential role in establishing a hierarchical order between the EU and its 
constituent members. The redefinition of norms in narrower forms aims at professionalizing the 
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enlargement process and securing the candidate’s readiness for accession. The increasing 
influence of norms on the accession negotiations sets precedence for their implication in the 
regulation of European affairs after accession. As a result, the quality of preparation of the 
acceding state and the successful implementation of the acquis in full will determine the 
efficiency of the administration of the EU based on shared norms.  
The present work leaves room for further research and will not explore the following 
hypothesis in the limits of this study: it is believed that the role of the Commission as a main 
checking body for compliance with the common norms will increase with the reliance on 
normative power. Consequently, norms constitute an area over which the Commission will enjoy 
full legitimate power of action and will increase its power to penetrate in the states’ affairs. 
Subsequently, as the internal organisation of the union will revolve around core norms, the union 
will cease to seek the expansion of its leverage abroad and will reassert its international leverage 
by focusing its normative power on building a normatively uniform internal administration. The 
EU will gain in credibility by strengthening its internal normative basis and by securing its 
borders. Only then the EU will be able to influence effectively its outer sphere of influence and 
the international arena.  
 
iv) The decay of state sovereignty 
 
State sovereignty is the last bastion against the domination of the European bodies over 
the member states: Zielonka’s blurred frontier between the core and the periphery fosters the 
influence of the states at the EU level and qualify the core as a provider rather than as an 
exploiter. Laïdi maintains state sovereignty and argues that norms are used to achieve internal 
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changes without eroding sovereignty. Both authors underline thus state sovereignty as the only 
feature of the European empire that remains unchanged despite the evolution of the union.  
The Normative Empire in this paper is based on the opinion that norms contribute to the 
willing erosion of state sovereignty and to the construction of an expanding normative platform 
of shared domination. Norms form a grey zone between supranational and national governance, 
to which the state has devolved its sovereign power of exclusive control. The EU is thus 
empowered to interfere, regulate and judge the areas concerned with the application of European 
norms. As mentioned previously, the multiplication of European norms expands the size of this 
common platform and has an exponential effect on the leverage of the EU over the member 
states. This intensification of the power relations do not induce a direct infringement of state 
sovereignty but sets the Commission, creator and guardian of norms, as the main dominant 
player. The imposition of conditionality reinforces this tendency among new member states and 
leads to a greater erosion of state sovereignty in favour of the Commission during the accession 
negotiations, which is likely to retain a central place after accession. 
  
In line with the theoretical set-up of the Normative Empire, the Commission is believed 
to develop its platform for action and inference in state governance by relying on a broadly 
stretched definition of conditionality. As already mentioned, conditionality contributes to the 
bulk of European norms, which are then transposable to the post-accession phase and directly 
applicable to the member states. The Commission is thus expected to get more actively involved 
in the protection of norms in current and prospective member states and to monitor subsequent 
reforms by issuing normative recommendations to the states and state institutions.  
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c. Foreword to the findings 
 
The concept of Normative Empire can only acquire conclusive credibility if tested against 
tangible facts; this research will thus answer to the question why the increasingly significant role 
of the independence of the judiciary in conditionality contributed to the transformation of the EU 
into a Normative Empire. The demonstration of such a transformation will retain influential 
consequences for the conduct of future enlargements and subsequently for the management of 
the EU as a whole. It will buttress the Commission’s normative power as an administrator of the 
union endowed with direct legitimate leverage in state governance. 
In line with the theoretical framework outlined above, the analysis will verify the 
subsequent hypothesis: the transposition of norms from the pre to the post-accession phase will 
lead the EC to enlarge and to administer the EU through the systematic use of norms. The 
Commission will respond to the lack of observance of European norms in current and 
prospective member states by enacting narrower normative definitions of the core European 
principles and will thus extend its scope of intervention in state governance in its capacity of 
guardian of European law. The Commission is currently split between its function of mediator 
calling for the instauration of common norms and its increasingly prominent role of 
administrator monitoring the observance of these norms in the states facing difficulties of 
implementation. The idea of administrator frustrates the enshrined intergovermentalist conviction 
of non-intervention from EU instances in states’ affairs. Conversely, norms call for uniform 
application and compliance, therefore solving the dilemma in favour of the domination of the 
Commission over normative matters in the member states after accession. As a consequence, the 
elaboration of European norms resulting from the convergence of the pre and post-accession 
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phases will promulgate a change in the dynamic of the relations between the EC and the member 
states towards the uncontested dominance of the Commission over norm-specific areas.  
The methodology draws upon an extensive analysis of the reports of the Cooperation and 
Verification Mechanism and the progress reports published by the European Commission. This 
reasoning will show the evolution of the normative leverage of the EU over two consecutive 
phases of enlargement and after accession. It will also shed light on the determinant role of the 
Commission in implementing and using norms as a main vector for policy-making. Henceforth, 
the conduct of the researches investigated the evidences supporting the existence of a European 
Normative Empire as well as its inward and outward perspective along the division enlargement 
and administration.   
The study cases of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia are acute for the demonstration of the 
evolution of conditionality and the increasing role of the Commission in imposing reforms in the 
pre and post-accession period. Romania and Bulgaria are the newest member states and 
consequently, account for the latest evolutionary changes in conditionality. Surprisingly, these 
two member states are amongst the rare members to have adopted formally the entire corpus of 
EU law. Romania attributes more value to European laws considering them of better quality than 
the ones presented by the Romanian parliament, whereas Bulgaria approaches the transposition 
of European laws into the domestic legal system as accelerating its full integration in the EU75. 
However, EU law is poorly enforced in both countries due to the deficiencies of the judicial 
systems76.   
These elements must be studied in line with the ongoing accession negotiations in Croatia 
as together they draw a picture of systematic use and reliance on conditionality in the 
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enlargement process. In addition to their geographical kinship, these three cases share issues of 
rampant corruption, notably in the political and judicial structures, remaining the main obstacles 
to their accession or full membership. Consequently, one the most privileged strategies adopted 
by the Commission to curb this problem consists in guaranteeing the independence of the 
judiciary and by enabling it with the sufficient capabilities and powers to check on the branches 
of power and the societal strata. Hence, studying the place dedicated to the independence of 
judiciary in the application of conditionality and during the accession negotiations/once in the 
union becomes a natural component aspect of the relations between Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia 
and the EU. 
With regards to the methodology, this research aims at demonstrating the role of norms in 
administrating and enlarging the EU by studying the progress reports and the Cooperation and 
Verification Mechanism reports. The CVM is an instrument that has been added as part of the 
obligations for Romania and Bulgaria in the early years of membership. This instrument aims at 
remedying and monitoring the judicial reforms in these states and thus to compensate for the lack 
of readiness at the time of accession. The CVM reports are designed and enforced by the 
Commission in order to monitor the reform of the judiciary in these two member states and take 
into account the differences in the respective national institutional structures. The Commission 
assesses by means of these reports the progress in reforming law enforcement structures since 
accession77. 
 For the purpose of this study, only the progress reports from 2004 onwards for Bulgaria 
and Romania have been studied in order to focus more specifically on the pre-accession 
achievements and shortcomings (of the state and of the Commission) in judicial matters. 
Conversely, it has used all the reports published for Croatia since the official opening of 
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accession negotiations in 2005.  In addition, the compilation of the progress reports ensued from 
the evolution of the progress reports for Romania and Bulgaria to the edition and expansion of 
the CVM have been analysed. Progress reports and CVMs share striking common features and 
coordinated pace of reforms, which gives way to shaping a European judicial model. 
Furthermore, although the CVM and the progress reports are drafted and compiled by different 
secretariats --General and Enlargement--, there exists a dynamic link between these two sets of 
reports and the CVM exerts some influence on the pace and tone of the negotiations with 
Croatia.  
Official documents show the way European policy is drafted and meant to be 
implemented; they give thus a global understanding of the underlying obligations of 
membership. Consequently, the meaning of the common values is determined by the consistency 
of the development over time of policy.  The Commission’s reports provide comparable and 
objective material that decides the progress of the candidates towards the completion of EU 
standards, the internalisation of founding values and the final reward of membership78. The 
formulation of policy prevails here over the actual success of transformation of the judiciary.  
 
 
The second section of this work has proposed a revised version of the concept of the Normative 
Empire inspired from earlier findings and theories of Zielonka and Laïdi and addressed the 
shortcomings of the aforementioned works. It has also aimed at exploring the inward and 
outward scopes of normative power by interpreting further the administrating and enlarging 
aspects of the EU.  The key role of the Commission and its relations with norms and 
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conditionality constitute a significant addition to the literature and the revolving centre for the 
Normative Empire.  
 
Part III. Building an Independent Judiciary in the Candidates and the Member States  
 
This third chapter is the core of this research and the basis for the above theories. This section 
will demonstrate the process of metamorphosis of the EU into a Normative Empire and how the 
present situation in Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania reflects the importance of this concept in real 
settings. The study will focus on the building of an independent judiciary in order to expose the 
different sources of leverage and degrees of authority of the Normative Empire in the pre and 
post-accession phases. The chapter’s argumentation will be divided in three subsections. The 
first subsection will introduce the evolution of the independence of the judiciary in European 
norms over the years by addressing the reformulation and sophistication of European standards 
in this matter and by investigating the evolutionary link between the CVM in Bulgaria and 
Romania with the accession negotiations with Croatia. The second sub-part will investigate the 
process of instrumentalisation of conditionality and will examine the incremental changes in the 
implementation of conditionality and the detail of the recommendations. The last section will 
assess the success of the parallel strategies (enlarging and administrating) to carry out 
fundamental changes towards an independent judiciary. It will compare the results achieved in 
Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia individually. This final analysis will rest on the relative successes 
and shortcoming of the reforms as well as their pace.  
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1) The Independence of the Judiciary in EU Law 
 
European law borrows heavily from International Law principles, as defined under the diverse 
UN criteria, the Council of Europe and case law of the ECHR79. As a consequence, there are no 
clear definitions in EU law of the principles that are considered universally applicable. This is 
the case of the independence of the judiciary, a recognised essential attribute of a functioning 
legal system and of the separation of powers. However, implementation and customary practice 
is another source of definition and is better applicable to the case of European law. The 
independence of the judiciary in EU enlargement law is the product of incremental changes in 
accession negotiations and the redefinition of the focus of reforms necessary for European 
membership.  
  
a. A newly born European Norm 
i) The Independence of the Judiciary 
 
The independence of the judiciary is not mentioned explicitly in any of the founding treaties but 
remains nonetheless anchored amongst the key European principles that member states and 
candidates to European membership must abide to in order to integrate the EU.  
 This principle originates in the spirit of the rule of law; both principles converge towards 
the liberation of the judges to make their decision based on facts and law, the application of law 
upon all and the power to check upon the executive and legislature80. The rule of law is a 
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guarantee of freedom for all81 since it constrains any exercise of power to conform to Law and 
thus suppresses arbitrary rule. According to Dicey, the rule of law bears the subsequent features: 
supremacy of the Law over arbitrary power, equality before the Law with disregard to class or 
social distinctions, application of individual rights as stated in the constitutions82.  
 Consequently, an independent judiciary is the mark of a healthy political system enjoying 
full separation of powers and a functioning society. For this purpose, the judiciary must be 
supported formally and socially. The legal system must be enabled with the consequent power 
and means to perform its duties in the official documents and by the executive. It must also enjoy 
public confidence in the fairness of its judgements.  Moreover, the independence of the judiciary 
stresses one of the core principles of the EU: the separation of power or Trias Politicas. This 
precept is a symbol of the democratic inheritance of the EU83 and further raises the expectations 
concerning the set-up of the state to become a member state.  
 As the EU was moving eastward and as the pre-accession reforms needed depth, the 
independence of the judiciary became an inherent principle of conditionality and arose as a 
matter of priority in the judicial reforms during the last and present enlargements84. After the fall 
of Communism, the judiciary in Central and most particularly in Eastern and South-Eastern 
Europe was heavily damaged by corrupted practices decupled by the lack of means allocated to 
the judiciary. Establishing independent judiciaries became a mean to remedy to the spread of 
crime and corruption from the eastern borders and stimulated the democratisation process85. 
Strengthening the judiciary on the periphery is the only mean at hand to maintain the internal 
stability of the EU.  The independence of the judiciary plays an important role in the existence of 
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a functioning union by curbing corruption, allowing the prosecution of criminal organisation, and 
increasing public trust in the governments and the EU as a whole.  
 
ii) Towards a European norm 
 
 Enlargement in the Normative Empire is understood as the development and application 
of common norms onto candidate states. In addition, enlargement has a retroactive effect on 
European norms: the process of accession isolates the lacunae of the candidates in the different 
policy sectors and hence helps towards the expansion and adjustment of EU law in the lacking 
areas. Enlargement gives thus the opportunity to the Commission to redefine European common 
norms and to adapt to the plurality of composition of the member states. The fact that the 
principle of independence was put at the forefront of the negotiations translates the 
Commission’s concerns with the fight against corruption, as this issue gained momentum with 
the 2007 accession.   
  The prevalence of the rule of law among the European norms appeared for the first time 
in the Maastricht treaty under the Article 237 before being transposed as criterion for accession 
in the Copenhagen criteria86. The independence of the judiciary became a criterion of its own in 
2005 with the opening of the negotiations with Croatia. This underlines the concern of the EU 
raised by the dysfunctional judiciaries in Central and Eastern Europe at that time. The absence 
of/flawed independent judiciary in post-communist societies pushed the Commission to develop 
a reform strategy that would enable the implementation of an overarching structure for the 
judiciary to become more efficient and independent.  
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 Kochenov in his critique of conditionality denounces the lack of guidance or common 
European model in conditionality. The lack of clear interpretation of the treaties and set criteria87 
increases the discretionary power of the member states and leads to a lowering of the quality of 
the European medium standards rather than to the creation of a union composed of 
heterogeneous members yet compatible with one another88. Nevertheless, although Konechov’s 
work represents an extensive and recent study of conditionality, it ignores the recent enrichment 
of conditionality and the most recent enlargement negotiations with Croatia. The study was 
published in 2008 and remained on the bitter European failure to reform Bulgaria and Romania 
before their accession or rather their success in entering the union without having completed the 
Copenhagen criteria. Kochenov could not have taken into account the progress made by these 
two member states under the CVM and the subsequent adaptation of conditionality to Croatia.       
  The EU sets its criteria for judicial independence based on core principles retrieved from 
international and national law. Attention is particularly devoted to the security of the tenure, 
financial security of the judiciary, administrative independence notably of the Prosecutor’s 
office89, appointment of the judges by whom and based on what qualifications, duration of terms 
of office and the conditions for promotion, transfer, cessation of functions. As Kochenov points 
out, the Commission aimed at implementing the principle of meritocracy in the legal system, as a 
basis for an independent judiciary90. He mentioned three additional safeguards for the 
appointment of judges advocated by Kruijer and encouraged by the Commission: the implication 
of a third party such as a self-governing institution in the appointment process, the strict 
maintenance of objective criteria of selection and the addition of a special safeguard such as 
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status in order to guarantee the independence of the appointees91. The aforementioned criteria for 
independence aim at distancing the judiciary from the executive and at extracting as much power 
and self-sufficiency as possible from the other branches. This distrust of the executive is 
characteristic of the eastern enlargements, since the EU conveyed traditionally her directives 
through the executive, using it as a vector for reforms. As a consequence, in spite of the fact that 
the judiciary is appointed by the executive in most countries, this is seen as counter-productive in 
Central and Eastern Europe and undermining the establishment of an independent judiciary in 
these member states as a result of the politico-historical reasoning adopted by the Commission92.    
 
b. Elaboration and Formulation of European Standards of Independence of Judiciary  
i) Sophistication of the Independence of the Judiciary in the Benchmarks 
 
 The importance of the principle of independence and the sophistication of this principle over 
time is better grasped when retracing chronologically the expansion of the space devoted to it in 
the reports.  
 The independence of judiciary was covered by the criterion of the rule of law in the 
Copenhagen criteria. The section dedicated to the political criterion as mentioned above carried 
the most weight from a normative perspective and it is under this heading that the rule of law 
was covered in a meagre subsection dedicated to the judicial system93. The independence of the 
judiciary was briefly referred to or implied until 2005. The subpart on the judicial system 
covered a total of two pages and an additional one on the fight against corruption in 2005. The 
maximum space reported for Bulgaria and Romania amounted to a total of five pages. 
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Conversely in 2005, Croatia’s first progress report was organised differently and an inclusion of 
chapter 23 for judicial matter and fundamental rights was added to the assessment provided 
under the political criterion. A larger section was devoted to the independence of the judiciary, 
covered now in a separate section. The devoted space amounted to eight pages in total.  A total 
of eleven to fifteen pages dedicated to the judicial system, its independence and to the fight 
against corruption is visually more impressive than three pages for the precedent enlargement.   
 The Cooperation and Verification Mechanism is entirely devoted to building an 
independent judiciary and translates concerns for the judiciary that never occurred outside 
twining projects for the previous enlargements. The CVM changed over time in line with the 
evolution of the progress reports. The first reports issued in 2007 were solid documents of 
twenty-five pages isolating the main issues to solve. In 2008, memos and technical updates were 
added to the reports. The technical updates provide detailed quantitative information about the 
reform which are then analysed in the reports. This year also presented an overview of the 
financial tools at hand and the amount allocated for specific reforms under each benchmark. 
There has been no further mention of the financial structure of the CVM in the other reports, 
which does not undermine their validity over time. 2009 and 2010 saw an acceleration in the 
monitoring of the CVM, reports and related documents were produced on a biannual frequency. 
Each report’s length varied between seven and ten pages and provided an analytical synthesis of 
the technical updates, varying between seventeen and twenty pages. This normative instrument 
marked the devotion of unprecedented attention to the independence of the judiciary and the 
strong will of the Commission to complete this project.  
   Claims of sophistication of European norms are paradoxical and contradict the absence 
of European model often criticised in the literature. An immediate approach of the Copenhagen 
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criteria and the successful accession of Bulgaria and Romania with impaired judiciaries would 
underline rather the flexibility of the accession criteria, the vagueness of the treaties and the lack 
of systematic supervision of the accession negotiations94. However, the essence of enlargement 
and European norms does not lie in the formal appearance of the treaties but in their customary 
implementation. As a consequence, the nature of the accession negotiations is not static and 
enlargement broadens the horizons of issues the EU deals with95. As a result, the redefinition of 
the rule of law criterion set the independence of the judiciary as a priority under the political 
criterion96. 
Paradoxically, leniency and strictness qualify Bulgarian and Romanian accessions: the 
tolerated infringements to the Copenhagen criteria were soon followed by an unprecedented 
monitoring and the penetration of the Commission into state affairs with the CVM. 
Implementation of acquis is at the heart of the CVM, because the mere formal transposition of 
EU law to these member states had no effect on the lack of independence from the executive in 
Romania and the politicisation, the involvement in domestic politics and lack of accountability of 
the judiciary in Bulgaria97.  
The CVM is designed differently for each state and is adapted to the pre-accession situations; in 
Romania it aims at curbing corruption and in Bulgaria organised crime and corruption. The 
benchmarks are adapted to the different judicial systems and the various shortcomings at 
different stages.  
Nevertheless, a preliminary examination of the CVM made possible to retrieve the 
dominant features of the two sets and to formulate the key criteria used by the Commission for 
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the assessment of the independence of the judiciary and the judicial system as a whole. The 
benchmarks tally on the following points. Independence and accountability of the judiciary is 
restated, implying legislative and financial independence from the executive and accountability 
to a third party such as a self-governing judicial institution responsible for the controlling the 
state of judicial proceedings. The latter is supported by more transparency and efficiency of the 
judicial system with a reinforcement of systematic internal inspections. A recurrent point in the 
reports is the lack of full-time trained inspectors that would maintain the system clean from 
corrupted practices. Realistic staffing models are essential in guaranteeing the functioning of the 
judiciary and preventing case overload of the courts. In both member states, too many positions 
for administrative staff, judicial advisors, prosecutors and judges are left vacant leading to a 
delay in judicial practices and encouraging the trade of influence. As important as the staff 
figures, financial autonomy and necessary means are essential to ensure the development of the 
judicial institutions: among which academic training and an inspectorate. Great breakthrough in 
both states has been the drafting of budget for the judiciary by judicial bodies (Supreme Judicial 
Council in Bulgaria and Supreme Council of Magistracy in Romania). Reporting on the 
monitoring and the results of the implementation of the legislation encourages the judiciary to 
take an active stance in the reform process alongside the Commission and later individually after 
completion of the CVM. The publication of evaluation of the reforms and track records of 
investigations encourages transparent practices in the system and fosters public trust in judiciary. 
The introduction of a code of ethics for judges and prosecutors represent formal guidelines 
judicial staff should abide to. Here again the discrepancy between formal application and 
implementation has been underlined by the Commission that denounces the lack of supervising 
mechanism and sanction in case of breach of ethics. Integrity agencies are a pure product from 
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the Commission designed for the eastern enlargements: these institutions aim at controlling 
conflict of influence and curbing corruption among judicial staff and political personalities. In 
Romania, the main issue is presently the veto by the parliament and the active legislative attack 
towards the integrity agency that proposes to review financial assets acquired by MP’s during 
their term of office. On the same line, bodies in charge of the fight against corruption must be 
empowered and their action coordinated and followed by the judiciary. Anti-corruption 
bodies/agencies translate the adaption of European policy to national issues, as these bodies have 
not been required to such an extent anywhere before the implementation of the CVM. Fight 
against corruption must be supported by initiatives and measures at the local level. EU’s leverage 
does not go as far as regulating sub-territorial strata but the EU is active through a remote 
monitoring nonetheless. The final core feature of the CVM touches upon the European character 
of the reforms and call for the implication of the other Member States in the reform process, 
fostering thus legal harmonisation within the union and inter-state cooperation.  
As a result, the benchmarks, disregarding the monitoring of the reforms itself, move away 
from the conventional normative statements in the Copenhagen criteria and instead formulate 
relatively practical guidelines for reforming the judiciary. On a side note, the guidelines under 
the ‘Guide to the main administrative structures for implementing the acquis’ only focus on the 
implementation of the acquis, whereas the CVM aims at reforming the institutional structure.  
Subsequent strengthening of the rules in Bulgaria and Romania is visible in the case of Croatia 
where the Commission focuses on judicial reforms and building independence in order to curb 
effectively the rampant corruption.  
ii) CVM and Conditionality in Croatia 
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There exist obvious parallels between the CVM and the progress reports for Croatia. As the 
Commission was drafting the CVM, it seems that it adapted its strategy for Croatian accession in 
order to avoid repeating the same mistakes. As early as 2005, a new chapter was added to the 
progress reports, turning thus the focus of the negotiations around judicial matters, inasmuch 
Croatia faces a concentration of power in the hands of the executive98. Chapter 23 in the progress 
reports already encompassed several features of the CVM benchmarks launched in 2007. These 
two monitoring systems should be understood as intertwined rather than one preceding the other. 
As a consequence, the articulation of the chapter 23 evolved with the implementation of the 
CVM and at the same pace as the changes operated in its benchmarks over time.  
In a chronological order, the progress report in 2005 concentrated on the independence 
and impartiality of the judiciary, the quality and efficiency of the judiciary, the access to the 
judiciary and legal guarantee and the implementation of anti-corruption measures. In 2007, the 
scope of focus increased and included professionalism, judicial reforms and expanded anti-
corruption policy. The report fell in line with the monitoring of the CVM. The convergence 
between the two instruments reached its peak in 2009 with the addition to the already existing 
categories on independence, impartiality, professionalism and competency, subsections on the 
quality of the infrastructure and the equipment and inspections of the judiciary and the reform 
strategy. The two sets came to cover approximately the same issues and to encourage reforms 
similar in content. Two additional subparts gave some national flavour to the report and 
concerned the rationalisation of the court networks and the revision of the judicial codes.  
The constant increase in depth and breadth of the monitoring of norms and EU principles 
in the reports brings stability and certainty to the enlargement process and ensures accession 
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once these benchmarks will be fulfilled, eroding the influence of the member states on the 
process of enlargement99.  
2) Instrumentalisation of Conditionality: Norms and Monitoring Recommendations 
Conditionality refers essentially to the pressures for reform preceding accession. However, the 
CVM altered this definition and extended conditionality to after accession. The extension of 
conditionality originates in the lack of pre-accession reforms and are characterised by the 
exclusive power of the Commission to supervise the judicial reforms in these states100. In 
addition, the CVM is enacted after the spirit of the Copenhagen criteria and thus demarcates 
Bulgaria and Romania from the rest of the community, relegating them to the status of secondary 
member states or in a transitory category between candidacy and full-fledged membership.  
The growing bulk of European norms does not only demonstrate the efforts by the EU to 
define its core principles but also implies the subsequent increase of the leverage of the 
Commission with their instrumentalisation. With regards to the latter, the instrumentalisation of 
conditionality refers to the systematic application and monitoring of the Copenhagen related 
norms, whereas instrumentalisation of norms defines the mode of governance applied on the 
member states upon accession. The following analysis is based on a thorough examination of the 
reports and the main arguments have been compiled in a working document attached in the 
annex. Due to the difficulty to refer to each report in the text, the facts mentioned below can be 
found in these tables. In addition, these were assembled for personal use only and analysis of the 
topic and therefore cannot be used in further work.   
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a. Addressees and legalistic dialogues 
Politicisation of the accession negotiations have plagued the enlargement policy with an image 
of political favouritism prevailing over long-term strategic considerations for the functioning of 
the EU as a coherent whole. Instrumentalisation of conditionality refutes this idea and 
promulgates the conclusion of the negotiations on a legalistic basis, criteria becoming part of 
European law taking precedence over political arguments.  
i) New partners in communication 
 
The immediate visible sign of instrumentalisation is the increase of leverage of the 
Commission in areas and over institutions under state governance. Key institutions and defined 
state organs became the new addressees of the Commission’s recommendations. In parallel, 
previous negotiations were rather characterised by the absence of interlocutor in the reports. The 
name of the state acceding constituted the only reference distinguishing the reports from one to 
the other. The Commission was thus not supervising directly the reform process in the candidate 
states and relied to a large extent on the reports compiled by the state on the progress of the 
reforms, discrediting its judgement on the actual readiness of any state to enter the union. In 
addition, this was inevitably accompanied with a concentration by the Commission’s pressure on 
the executive to implement the recommendations and inexorably in an imbalance in domestic 
politics in favour of the executive.  
The latest reports point out a diversification of the interlocutors addressed in the progress 
reports, most notably specific institutions responsible for reforming or in charge of a distinct 
section of the judiciary. The example of the reform of the judiciary demonstrates the 
inapplicability of sole reliance on the executive for carrying the reforms, as the essence of an 
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independent judiciary aims at distancing the two branches one from the other and not to 
empower the executive vis-a-vis the judiciary. This logic only appeared after the inadequacy of 
the judicial reforms in Romania and Bulgaria became obvious and their accession with flawed 
systems was confirmed.  
The progress reports of 2005 mark a turning point in the matter of addressees. Some 
precursory steps were taken with Bulgaria and Romania before being fully developed with 
Croatia. The progress report for Bulgaria for the first time associated the main issues with a 
responsible institution whereas the report for Romania restated the structure of the judicial 
system in a descriptive optic and with no relations with any particular issues faced by the 
judiciary. In comparison, Croatia’s first report not only defined the structure of the judicial 
system and the relations between the different bodies but also determined the main issues faced 
by Croatia especially with regards to corruption and the lack of independence of the judiciary, 
additionally, associated them with the respective judicial institutions and defined the area under 
their responsibility to be reformed. Specific institutions became thus the direct addressees of the 
Commission during the accession negotiations. The Commission still held accountable the 
executive --the Ministry of Justice-- for discrepancies in the results of the reforms but also 
directly instructed institutions such as the State Judicial Council, the Prosecutor’s office, 
Committee for Prevention of Conflict of Interest (Integrity Agency), National Council for Anti-
Corruption and the Judicial Academy.  
The benchmarks for the CVM followed the same pattern of division of the dialogue. 
They are divided along set goals, core related issues and concordant institutions. The 
benchmarks for Romania are more targeted in general, as the second and third points concern 
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directly two specific institutions -- ANI (Integrity Agency) and DNA (Directorate for the fight 
against corruption) --  instead of specific issues.  
As a consequence, the Commission adopted an active stance on the conduct of reforms 
by recommending, assessing and imposing tasks onto specific state institutions. Infiltration of the 
Commission in the governance of the state was never performed before Croatia’s candidacy and 
the accession of Bulgaria and Romania. Pre-accession leverage of the EC reached a level never 
achieved before and set the Commission as the only dominant player in the negotiations. The 
Commission enjoys a much lesser enviable position in the CVM, as the power asymmetry 
characteristic to the pre-accession phase disappeared with the grant of membership and inasmuch 
as the association of the CVM with access to the Schengen zone is only a very recent matter. In 
addition, the interference of the EC in the state affairs is a lot more predominant in Bulgaria and 
Romania and directly constrains state sovereignty. The only possible explanation for the relative 
cooperation of the states with the CVM lies in the Commission’s role of norms provider and 
protector.  This status grants the EC legitimacy of action as a result of to the prevalence of 
European norms over state sovereignty.  
 
 
ii) Political Vs Legal Documents 
 
Rumours of Bulgaria and Romania entering the EU due to political considerations 
revived the ghosts of state control over accession. Furthermore, progress reports tend to be 
suspected of furthering the politicisation of the accession negotiations, as progress used to be 
determined on the basis of the pledges of the candidates states and the national analysis of the 
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reforms. Hence, it is presumed that the progress reports for Croatia would be more politically 
oriented than the CVM that deals directly with the obedience of the reforms with European 
norms.  
After examination of the reports, the opposite trend became apparent and the years 2007, 
and most particularly 2009 and 2010 demonstrate the resurgence of a legalistic discourse in both 
the progress reports and the CVM. It is difficult in general to distinguish political arguments 
from the formal writing style of the reports and thus to categorise legal and political arguments. 
The distinction between political and legal arguments was based upon the sources of the reports, 
the addressees of the Commission’s remarks, the place and the attitude of the EC towards the 
executive.   
The progress reports of 2007 and 2008 contain mostly legal recommendations and 
focused on the issues at hand. The political touches that have been denoted did not refer to the 
accession of Croatia. Instead political pressures were directed at the conduct of domestic politics 
in order to stress the urgency of the pre-accession adjustments. The Commission intervened in 
the regulation of the relations between the executive and the State Judicial Council -- SJC -- 
constituting a direct interference with state governance. 2009 was a crucial year in all reports and 
was accompanied with a severe assessment of the reforms and a strengthening of the 
recommendations. Political condemnations accumulated against the states’ political authorities 
that were called upon by the Commission to refrain from intervening in judicial matters in 
Croatia and to cooperate more actively in the case of Bulgaria and Romania.  
Moreover, in both cases, the second set of CVM reports placed more severe remarks 
towards the political sphere. Subsequently, the first set called for more dedication from the 
Bulgarian judiciary and executive to carry out the necessary reforms. In Romania, the political 
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message spread was more scathing and called for political consensus over lasting issues such as 
the formulation of the Criminal and Civil Codes, political cooperation with ANI --
recommendation directed especially to the parliament--, refrains from interfering and pressuring 
the DNA and condemnation of the initiatives taken by the parliament to modify the nomination 
procedure for the Chief Prosecutor. These remarks warned against Romania’s breach of 
obligations towards the European community at large. The second set followed suit on this tone: 
Bulgarian parliament attitude was condemned for blocking the introduction of legislations 
enabling the check of assets of civil servants in the context of the exercise of their functions and 
the Commission further criticised the adoption of recent changes in the legislation by the 
government, underlying that these were in contradiction with the commitment of Bulgaria 
towards the EU. The commission emphasized that establishing an independent judiciary should 
be the main goal for policy formation and that adhering to the CVM only provided a guiding 
path; hence cooperation between political and judicial actors as well as stronger commitment to 
the reforms and the refrain from the executive from adopting contradictory legislation were 
necessary steps towards guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary after termination of the 
CVM.  
If the Commission incriminated the executive in the Bulgarian case, it targeted Romanian 
political party politics and parliament for its attacks. The main threat to the independence of the 
judiciary in Romania originates from the politicisation of the judiciary by the parliament. The 
Commission thus called for an unequivocal commitment of the parties to the fight of high-level 
corruption and consistency in the legislative process accompanying the reform of the judiciary.  
The reports of 2010 mark an overturn in the presumptions: the progress reports reinforced 
its legal optic while the reports for the CVM kept their political added value. The progress report 
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retraced principally the various achievements and shortcomings of the reforms carried out by the 
different institutions and did not address any political body or the state. This report is considered 
to be more legally oriented because the recommendations and assessment of the Commission 
chiefly addressed the results of the reforms and to a lesser extent their conduct. Conversely, the 
CVM reports fell under the political category due to the extent the Commission interfered with 
the state’s internal politics, and most prominently in Romania. The latest CVM report at the time 
of the writing, dating from Autumn 2010, applauded the commitment of the executive to the 
reforms while emitting some reserves about the efforts of the judiciary to implement the 
aforementioned reworking of the legislation on the ground. The Commission was here primarily 
concerned with the internal politics of the judiciary and its relations with the executive rather 
than the reorganisation of the institutional framework.  
The political scope of the CVM is more obvious in the Romanian case, as the 
Commission went even as far as examining and condemning specific legislation adopted by the 
parliament. The second report condemned the law passed on ANI that blocks in effect the 
development and activity of the integrity agency. ANI’s legislation established a framework 
enabling the check on the state actors’ financial assets and laid down the legislation for their 
confiscation in case of discordance with the declaration and the imposition of appropriate 
sanctions. As a consequence, the EC reiterated its call for political commitment and cooperation 
between the judiciary and the political actors, here the parliament.  
As a result, the CVM was established on a legal basis as a continuity of conditionality and 
demonstrated over time high political value by interfering in the conduct of domestic politics. 
The Commission’s political claims are legitimized by the authority endowed by its role of norms 
protector. The resulting bypassing of state sovereignty by the CVM and during pre-accession 
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negotiations (on the basis of the Copenhagen criteria) feed into the idea exploited in this study 
about the increasing leverage of the Commission and subsequent interference of the Normative 
Empire at the sub-state level. The Copenhagen criteria have thus far reaching consequences on 
the gradual erosion of sovereignty.  
 
b. Adaptation of the Recommendations to the Recurrence of the Issues 
 
Another major aspect of instrumentalisation of conditionality is the evolution and adaptation of 
the recommendations to address new issues but also to remedy to recurrent and long-lasting 
imperfections. The similarities between dysfunctions affecting Croatian, Bulgarian and 
Romanian judiciaries influenced the Commission to adopt a single strategy for both the CVM 
and the accession negotiations.  
 
i) Consistent monitoring  
 
 An inherent strength of the reports is their consistency of analysis over time thanks to 
which it is possible to retrace the recurrence of certain issues chronologically and to draw 
parallels between related problems in different documents. For instance, the benchmarks for the 
CVM were set with regards to problems recurring before accession such as the shortage of 
staffing, the lack of professionalism, the inadequacy of infrastructures, the lack of accountability 
and transparency of judicial practices, the inefficiency and insufficiency of the prosecution of 
high level corruption and the general lack of independence for the judiciary.  
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 The benchmarks could be criticised for constraining the adjustment of the Commission’s 
strategy to respond effectively to unsuspected issues. The fixed nature of the benchmarks and 
their subparts could then favour consistent analysis of the reforms at the expense of address the 
evolution of the judiciary. Nevertheless, this reasoning is erroneous. Flexibility of observation is 
guaranteed with the Technical Updates. Their subsequent analysis, which is always done with 
reference to the original benchmarks, extrapolates the investigations and the scope of the 
recommendations. The formulation of the recommendations perpetrates the continuity of the 
observations and existing pressures from the previous reports.  
 The progress reports for Croatia respect the same consistency over time outlined for the 
CVM and isolate the recurrent issues determining the direction of the reform strategy. Croatia is 
thus criticised for the lack of transparency of its appointment procedure, the promotion and 
transfer of judges and prosecutors and the standards for judicial trainees, the lack of adequate 
training for judges, prosecutors and judicial advisors, politicisation of the system, a lack of 
understanding of the term conflict of interest, the lack of impartiality in prosecution of war 
criminals and focuses on the good functioning of the integrity agency and USKOK (the organ in 
charge of the fight against corruption). The organisation of the reports revolves around these core 
themes and in 2009 they were classified under separate sub-categories. As a result, the constant 
effort to match the scope of the issues faced by the candidate contributes to a deepening of the 
reporting mechanism.  
 Moreover, although no direct cross-reference between the CVM and the accession of 
Croatia exists, the similarities between the reporting and the nature of the issues investigated is 
unmistakable. Hence, while taking into account the variation in scope due to national 
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particularities, the common focus of the Commission’s reporting contributes towards a definition 
for the EU of the core features of an independent judiciary.      
 
ii) Recommendations and the evolution of European norms 
 
 The recommendations are the keystone of the instrumentalisation of conditionality since 
they guide the future path of the reforms and since their main function is to digest the European 
norms into applicable measures.  
 Diplomatic writing style and political correctness make the strict categorisation of the 
recommendations a difficult task. Subsequently, this study looked into different aspects of the 
recommendations in order to grasp their intended effect and explain the variations in 
achievements. The Commission’s arguments have been studied under the lenses of normative 
weight, tone, burden of change and the European-domestic spectrum.  
 The normative weight of the recommendation is the most salient aspect, because it shows 
the ability or incapability of the Commission to formulate clear guidelines that will promulgate 
the implementation of European norms.  
 The initial division of norms in normative and practical categories revealed to be 
unsatisfying due to the lack of clarity of the texts and left out a majority of the hidden 
recommendations. The hidden recommendations appear quite easily to a logical mind reading the 
reports, but remain implied and difficult to place in either category. The normative category 
encompasses normative statements restating European norms and principles without giving 
further guidance as how to transform these norms into reality. Conversely, practical 
recommendations appear to be too restrictive and would imply the existence of European models 
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as for instance of independent judiciary and would provide the candidate state with a set of strict 
criteria and rules to comply with. Yet, there is no such thing as a determined European model 
due to the diversity of judicial systems in Europe and to the reluctance of the member states to 
sacrifice sovereignty and accept such a level of harmonization.  
 The categorisation of recommendations along a normative-practical scale opened more 
possibilities. Consequently, semi-normative recommendations represent a majority of the 
instructions found in the reports. This type of guidance combines normative formulation with 
further explanation for implementation, most often with regards to a specific institution or 
describing the relations between the institution and the political sphere to be achieved. However, 
the suggestions do not go as far as giving precise numbers or detailed recipes for a successful 
implementation. This attitude may have negative impact on the conduct of the reforms and may 
encourage discretionary formal implementation of the Commission’s recommendations. 
Nevertheless, vagueness must also remain an inherent feature of the instructions in order to 
maintain the necessary feeling of state sovereignty over the reform process and to guarantee the 
capability of the state to ensure the functioning of its judicial system after the end of the CVM or 
upon accession. In this way, the recommendations are composed of direct and implied 
instructions that allow implementation to remain flexible and balance the political relations. 
Subsequently, the implied recommendations refer to the use of negative language to underline 
the lack of or the necessity to implement certain measures or to remedy to a recurrent issue.  
 In line with the argumentation of this research, the guidance in the progress reports for 
Croatia are more direct and clearer than in the pre-accession reports for Bulgaria and Romania. 
The larger space devoted for Croatia allows the insertion of statistics and details, whereas the 
constricted analysis of the judicial systems in Bulgaria and Romania and the more detached 
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attitude of the Commission towards the accession negotiations led to the scarce inclusion of 
implied and semi-practical recommendations.  
 The first years of the CVM and concordant progress reports for Croatia demonstrate the 
same cautious attitude of the Commission as highlighted above. Although the CVM benchmarks 
set goals and the direction of the reforms, direct recommendations remain absent from the text. 
Similar situation in Croatia, very few direct recommendations were put forward and the 
Commission relied on implied suggestions underlining the lack of progress in specific sectors or 
the recurrence of a particular issues, chiefly the lack of objective criteria for appointment and 
promotion in the judicial system.  
 The turning point in reports published in 2009 was the change of tone of the EC. The 
definition of tone is somewhat subjective but on the whole can be interpreted as encouraging, 
condemning, positive or negative without needing to go into much detail. The apparent lack of 
progress achieved over the first two years of the CVM’s existence led the EC to revise its 
strategy and to adopt a tougher stance towards Bulgaria and Romania that eventually was echoed 
in Croatia. The reports for the CVM included an extensive assessment of the results of the 
reforms introduced since 2007 and for the first time provided a list of recommendations. The list 
restated the normative objectives of the CVM and the recommendations were divided in separate 
subsections addressing individual issues. In the case of Romania, the list was more extensive and 
the scope of the issues narrowed down into digestible segments. For both states, the tone of the 
reports was clearly condemning and threatening, referring to the imposition of safeguard clauses 
in case of non-compliance with the recommendations. Call for immediate results and clear 
commitment of the state to its pledges towards the EU demonstrated the growing concerns of the 
EC and the imposition of heavier pressure on the pace of the reforms. In parallel, although 
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Croatia had achieved reasonable progress with regards to the recommendations sent the previous 
year, a similar tone as for Bulgaria and Romania was adopted in the course of the negotiations. 
The tightening of the pressures on Croatia to a certain extent finds its origin in Bulgaria and 
Romania and is due to the state of the reforms there. The year 2009 is also remembered for the 
postponing of the accession of Croatia.  
The reports of 2009 marked the shift from reporting to assessing and as a consequence of 
the direct involvement of the Commission in the reform in all the three states. Despite the harsh 
tone and the incriminating remarks, the EC put forward a pedagogic strategy that was carried on 
in the reports of 2010. Hence, incriminations are accompanied with a restatement of the 
European norms and most importantly of the benefits for the state to implement these norms, 
amongst which establishing an independent judiciary. Nevertheless, it has to be noted that these 
recommendations -- few direct-- failed to provide guidance as how these objectives should be 
achieved.  
This pedagogic strategy was followed and further explored in the 2010 reports. The 
Commission undertook to underline the shortcoming, to isolate the issues and to provide 
concrete example of the present shortcomings, further addressed specific institutions and 
provided a significantly more detailed analysis. As it has been highlighted above, Romania faced 
in 2010 most of the criticism and the wrath of the Commission; conversely, it was also the state 
to receive the most detailed recommendations and to benefit from the aforementioned pedagogic 
guidance. In comparison, Croatia was in a more difficult position. Although the Commission 
applauded once more the success of its reforms, it also condemned in the same breath the lack of 
progress in certain areas and pointed out new issues. As a consequence, despite the conclusive 
and cooperative attitude of Croatian authorities, the Commission showed less patience towards 
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Croatia and required it to do subsequently more efforts in order to remedy to all the discrepancies 
of its judicial system before accession, discrepancies that will still take few years before being 
solved in Bulgaria and Romania.     
 
iii) Better domestic situation or becoming a better member state? 
 
Interestingly enough, the Commission combined in its argumentation, rhetoric on the 
commitment of the state to European membership and the benefits of the reforms domestically. 
The European scope is often put forward in the CVM and aims at stimulating Bulgaria and 
Romania to become better member states. Hence, they are regularly called upon to abide to 
European standards, implement member states best practices and honour their commitment to the 
EU. Nonetheless, the domestic level is not left out and plays an important role in supporting 
reforms incentives. Public trust in the judiciary and visibility of the reforms by the population are 
the main references to domestic affairs and pressures the governments to be accountable to both 
European authorities and the citizens. Comparatively, the progress reports for Croatia did not 
translate any European-domestic debate and the affinities of these two spheres. Judicial reforms 
are part of the greater scheme of accession negotiations and represent milestones on the way to 
membership. The domestic impact is left out. This constitutes a major difference between the 
CVM and the progress reports that could be interpreted as the volition to determine the 
prevalence of European recommendations over national considerations.  
Nevertheless, the Commission’s recommendations can be criticised on two points 
disregarding pre or post accession monitoring. Firstly, the burden of change is often to a large 
extent at the costs of the state. The description of the budget and allocation of funds figured in 
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2008 CVM reports and in every report for Croatia (extensive explanation given in 2005). The 
redistribution of the funds depends on the state and no scheme of implementation was provided 
by the Commission. Although such an approach puts a lot of trust in the state and respects in all 
point state sovereignty and its ability to manage its own budget, the lack of adequate funds and 
monitoring remain problematic. In times of crisis or high expenditures as pre-accession reforms, 
budget for reforms is a sensitive nerve with large impact on other sectors. Moreover, admitting 
that the state has the financial capabilities to undertake the reforms, the lack of monitoring 
encourages diversion of the funds, as for instance, corruption in public procurement swallowing 
by far most of the European funds.  
Secondly, reform is based on an ad-hoc pace. States move forward by isolating what not 
to do rather than by knowing where to go. Moving forward walking backward results from the 
cautiousness of the Commission to exert measured interferences on sovereignty while refraining 
from infringing state self-determination. The controversy lies in the determination of the 
Commission to assert its normative weight and to encourage the states to respond satisfactorily to 
its normative concerns without giving any precise stipulations.  
 
As a consequence, the lack of narrow standards and ad-hoc reforms slow down the development 
of full-fledged European norms. According to Laïdi’s definition of norms, norms must be 
legitimised, observable over time, oriented towards a distinct objective, encompassing certain 
expected results and identifiable with particular standards. The latter is incomplete in the present 
state of the recommendations, despite some clear progress with regard to this matter over the last 
years.  
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3) Inter-influential Relations between Parallel Strategies: Administer Vs Enlarge 
 
This final section will synthesise the achievements of the Commission with regards to the 
progress made towards an independent judiciary in Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania. It will allow 
the comparison of the results achieved under the respective strategies of enlargement and 
administration of the Normative Empire, and of the transposition of enlargement elements to 
administration of post-accession.  
 The leverage of the Commission fluctuates according to whether the state is a candidate 
or a European member state and decreases considerably after closure of the negotiations101. 
Although the strength of the leverage is not a negligible aspect of the Normative Empire as 
demonstrated by the extensive literature on the topic102, the exercise of leverage provides more 
insights on the functioning of the Normative Empire. It is thus necessary to examine how the 
application of European norms in systematic patterns, the similarities between the CVM and the 
progress reports and the instrumentalisation of conditionality fit in the dichotomy between 
administration and enlargement. 
 
a. Administer and Enlarge 
 
In the logic of the Normative Empire, norms are the foundations and source of power of the EU. 
However, their nature and purposes vary with accession. Pre-accession normative pressures are 
administered through a carrot and stick strategy, compliance holding the key to a fast access to 
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membership. Upon accession, the choice of tools for pressuring the states is limited and is 
confined to the application of financial sanctions, safeguard clauses or isolation. Subsequently, it 
is assumed in the logic of the Normative Empire that after accession, the EC is relegated to the 
role of administrator and its power lies in the protection of norms. Recalling Zielonka’s imperial 
structure, the Commission’s main function is to supervise the implementation of EU law. The EC 
retracts to the form of minimal authority core of the Normative Empire and exerts its sprawling 
power over a broad range of areas spreading through the polycentric structure of EU law.  
 Consequently, norms fall in line with this additional role of the Commission. As 
demonstrated by the CVM, instrumentalisation of conditionality is uniform in the pre and post 
accession phases, norms differ thus in nature and ends. Recapitulating points mentioned above, 
conditionality is used to a large extent in the context of enlargement, the CVM is particular in 
this sense because it extends conditionality to the sphere of ‘administration’, after accession. 
Conditionality regroups structural norms that aim chiefly at the construction of new institutions 
and at making the candidate state compatible with the bulk of EU law and the machinery of the 
European institutions. Secured compatibility ensures the protection of the EU and the respect of 
its norms. The application of conditionality goes hand in hand with the Commission’s 
asymmetrical power. Their symbiosis is characterised by the necessity to justify in the European 
treaties the imposition of the EC dominance onto acceding states with regards to the 
implementation of conditionality. In parallel, the implementation of conditionality rests on the 
necessity to rely on this asymmetry. This duality accelerated the evolution of the EU’s normative 
power and consequently the leverage of the Commission from being confined to the role of 
reporter during earlier accessions to the one of judge assessing results, setting tasks, giving 
recommendations and more recently interfering at the state level.  
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 Norms involved in the administration of the community have regulatory purposes. 
Accession assumes the compatibility of the state with the other member states and with the 
European institutions. Subsequently, norms implemented in this setting aim at protecting the 
normative balance of the union. Regulation intervenes early after accession and concerns the 
balance between the branches of power or the protection of the European norm of the Trias 
Politicas. Until 2005, most pressures during pre-accession were exclusively put on the executive 
resulting in tilting the balance of power in its favour. Efforts to maintain the balance between the 
branches are visible with the recent reorientation of the enlargement policy and post-accession 
monitoring in the CVM. The independence of the judiciary is a crucial aspect of the preservation 
or creation of a system of Trias Politicas.  
 
b. Independence of the Judiciary, a work in progress 
  
 The extension of conditionality to post-accession blurs the line between administrating 
and enlarging the EU and leads to some contradictory moves in practice. Premature accession 
forced the Commission to carry out structural reforms while dealing with Bulgaria and Romania 
as member states capable of contributing to the union as such. The controversy is most 
prominent with regards to the independence of the judiciary. Parts of the CVM monitor the 
building and empowerment of institutions guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary while 
others balance the judiciary against the legislature and the executive, as proven by the critics 
against the parliament in Romania and the government in Bulgaria. An independent judiciary 
relies on the preservation of the Trias Politicas, which protects the judiciary from the influence 
of the executive. As pointed out, that is only if the judiciary is capable and has the necessary 
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resources to function independently. Yet, the creation and empowerment of judicial institutions 
heavily depends on the two other branches and only once enabled to carry their functions, can 
they guarantee the independence of the judiciary. As a result, the Commission called upon the 
parliament and executive to depoliticise the judiciary and to refrain from interfering in judicial 
affairs, while encouraging the diverse judicial bodies to proclaim their independence from the 
executive, notably by acquiring budgetary power, conducting internal inspections, controlling 
appointment and promotion procedure, encouraging developments of the Prosecutor’s office, the 
integrity agency and the anti-corruption body. The slow pace of the reforms under the CVM is 
thus explained by the contradiction that exists in practice between the aims of the 
recommendations and the protection of a principle still making its first steps. 
Consequently, the extent of achievements in constructing independent judiciaries in these 
countries draws out the borderline of the normative power in administering and enlarging. The 
counterproductive pace of the reforms is underlined by the relative success of the reform of the 
judiciary in Croatia in comparison to the ones undertaken by the CVM: creation of an integrity 
agency whereas the idea was just touched upon in the 2010 report for Bulgaria, a new judicial 
academy with a updated training for all professions and more independent from the executive 
(which can no longer appoint the judicial trainees), a more competent judicial inspectorate and a 
effective anti-corruption body, USKOK. However, case backlog and rationalisation of the court 
system slow down the functioning of the judiciary. Moreover, although the pressures of the 
Commission to contain the executive’s influence on the judiciary bore some fruit especially with 
regards to the judicial academy, the Commission has reiterated its demands for complete self-
regulation and autonomy of the State Judicial Council and the State Prosecutor Council. Success 
is thus very relative.  
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Building independence in the absence of factual means resulted in fewer results in the 
CVM and clashes between the Commission and the states over sovereignty. Bulgaria’s 
Prosecutor office remains weak and subordinated to political decisions resulting in too few 
prosecution or indictments of cases of high level of corruption despite clear condemning 
evidences. The same applies to the cases of conflict of influence and the procedure of indictment 
for these cases. Romania is also pointed out for the loopholes in the legislation protecting 
conflicts of interest. The law against ANI, the integrity agency, stirred considerable discontent in 
the Commission’s ranks and Romania is called to reverse the trend at once. Severe delays in the 
negotiations of the Criminal and Civil Codes (and their procedural codes) still remained and 
long-lasting issues regarding the management of human resources and optimal working 
conditions/ infrastructures still remain the focus of the recommendations. In spite of the 
development of a constructive method of assessment in the CVM, the implementation of changes 
through structural norms still collides with the reluctance of the member states to abide to the 
Commission’s directives, resulting in abandoning individual discretionary power over policy 
implementation. It has to be noted that all the three states suffer from the same evils: the overly 
powerful place of the executive (or legislative for Romania) in the state arrangement finding no 
counter balance in the lack of initiative and involvement of the judiciary.  
Moreover, the absence of reward after accession does not stimulate the states to find 
national solutions to EU’s normative concerns. Sanctions also remain inadequate and are 
confined to financial matters. Although the interruption of the pre-accession funds in 2008 
proved to have positive effects on Bulgaria103, financial sanctions remain unproductive when 
aimed at stimulating expensive reforms. Change can only occur through open cooperation with 
the Commission’s efforts.  
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c. Mixed results in perspective 
 
 The results of the reforms are mitigated and do not give justice to the efforts and the 
drastic evolution of European norms since the first eastern enlargement. The recent 
developments in the instrumentalisation of conditionality underlined throughout this study have 
given rise to a sophistication of the European mode of normative governance. Norms have 
gained importance in the conduct of European affairs and the CVM points out the volition of the 
EC to administer member states through the exclusive use of norms. The commitment of the EU 
to form policies based on the European founding principles and values marks the complete 
internalisation of norms not solely at the EU level but also the necessity for the aspiring and 
existing member states to commit to these core values104. The redefinition of the Copenhagen 
criteria and European norms through the instrumentalisation of conditionality led to a better 
coordination of the Commission’s activity and monitoring. Consequently, the prioritisation of the 
independence of the judiciary in the region shows the willingness of the EU to explore tangible 
and practical solutions to corruption and to prepare the states to European membership.  
Enlarging and administrating the EU are becoming thereupon increasingly intertwined with the 
spread of structural norms in the administration of the member states. European norms are 
broken down into a multitude of narrower norms directly applicable by the states. The CVM is 
the most flagrant example of the ramification of a web of norms since the volume of normative 
recommendations advocated by the Commission is skyrocketing. This tendency affects the 
ongoing accession of Croatia as well as the conduct of European affairs, such as the Hungarian 
media law.   
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Moreover, the normative power conferred to the EC in the CVM, empowered the latter to 
affirm its position and to take an active stance in state affairs, which is almost unconceivable in 
traditional intergovernmentalist schemes. By setting a foot in every institution and by openly 
criticising political bodies, the Commission reasserted its place of dominant actor and capability 
to monitor, if only formally, the changes operated in the judiciary. In line with the previous 
demarcation between regulatory and structural norms, the diversification of addressees allowed 
the EC to get directly involved in domestic affairs and state governance and to attempt to balance 
the relations between the power branches by making political and normative condemnations. The 
Commission imposed itself as a dominant normative authority whose power prevails over 
national sovereignty. At last, it is worth noting that the recent development in the enlargement of 
the Schengen zone adds to the credibility of the European normative governance. The CVM has 
become recognised, formally and perhaps ephemerally, as a barrier to the spread of corruption 
and as an efficient tool for transmitting European norms.  
 The idea of Normative Empire lies in the spread of norms in all domains of European 
activity, enlargement being one of the most visible and covered in the media. Instrumentalisation 
of these norms, here their implementation and their contribution to policy formation, constitutes 
the central pillar of this empire. Without the development of strategies using norms 
systematically as a main source of power and legitimacy, the EC would lose its influence and the 
idea of Normative Empire would vanish. The outcomes presented by this paper demonstrate 
quite the opposite. The EU is moving away from its intergovernmental origins due to the 
dysfunctions accumulating with the growing number of members and national discrepancies, and 
thus experiments with normative strategies in order to keep the European machinery rotating 
while maintaining state sovereignty.  
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It has to be noted that the strong leverage of the Commission in the pre-accession phase is 
essential in order to facilitate post-accession administration. After accession, recalling Zielonka’s 
polycentric structure, the Commission should confine itself to supervising the respect of EU law 
and only conduct changes with regards to the application of new common legislation. The 
transitory phase, close to political quarantine, in which Romania and Bulgaria are left in, should 
remain of extraordinary resort. If normative power is to become the fuel of European leverage 
domestically and internationally, normative compatibility between European member states is 
crucial.              
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The comparison of the EU to an empire is not new and neither is the idea of European 
normative power. The novelty of this research lies in the interweaving of these two components 
to form a coherent definition of the contemporary European Union. The literature review left 
many blank spaces between the respective theories of Laïdi and Zielonka. The revisited concept 
of Normative Empire aimed on one hand at filling the empty spaces and on the other at clarifying 
and exploring the relation between the ideas associated to an imperial Europe and the weight of 
norms in European decisions.  
 Preliminary researches on the role of norms in the EU demonstrated a positive tendency 
in the expansion of the network of European norms and of their sophistication. This trend 
became particularly visible throughout the most recent enlargement negotiations dating back to 
90 
 
2004 with the gradual insertion of the independence of the judiciary as a requirement for 
membership and with the development of an extended system of pre-accession monitoring. Since 
the enlargement wave in 2004, European norms have multiplied exponentially and have become 
more specific. Henceforth, the recent interest devoted to the construction of an independent 
judiciary in acceding states has two main implications for the Normative Empire.   
 Firstly, it sets precedence for the domination of the Commission over the conduct of all 
European affairs. The shift of power resulting from the deepening of the enlargement norms 
endowed the EC with full supervising and monitoring powers over the enlargement process. The 
expansion of the corpus of EU enlargement law contributed to strengthening the role of the 
Commission as the guardian of the treaties and European norms. Its function of guardian 
developed into the capacity of principal administrator of the union. Norms formally enacted in 
the enlargement negotiations have been transposed to the post-accession phase and carried the 
monitoring leverage of the Commission onto the new member states. The elaboration of norms 
established continuity between enlarging and administrating the EU through norms laying the 
foundations for the Normative Empire.  
 Secondly, the incremental deepening of enlargement customary law ensued in response to 
the accession of Central and Eastern European states orientates now the focal point of the 
Normative Empire towards the Balkans. The independence of the judiciary is crucial to the idea 
of Balkan membership, because its enactment aims not only at curbing corruption but is also an 
integral part of the overall process of democratisation. As a consequence, the study of the 
judicial reforms in Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia comes when the rest of the Balkans is 
preparing its candidacy. The outcome of these reforms and the increasing interest of the 
Commission in the independence of the judiciary will have significant repercussions on the 
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Balkan states and on the conduct of future enlargement negotiations. Alternatively, the focus on 
the rule of law can perhaps be interpreted as the elaboration of the normative measures designed 
to respond to issues specific to the Balkans. This specificity will augment the definition of 
European norms in size and in content for the whole of the Community bringing further 
European normative power internally and externally of the Union.   
 With regards to these first conclusions, this work analysed why the growing interest of 
the Commission in the independence of the judiciary contributed to the transformation of the EU 
into a Normative Empire. The independence of the judiciary occupies a determinant place in the 
European normative framework and its official inclusion in the corpus of EU law is not solely a 
legal headway but also reiterates the commitment of the EU to the promotion of democracy 
through the principles of the rule of law and the separation of power. The matter of judicial 
independence represents thus an interesting and pivotal paradigm to assess the imprint of the 
Normative Empire on tangible and real issues. Subsequently, the research verified the hypothesis 
that the transposition of norms from the pre to the post-accession phase would lead the EC to 
enlarge and to administer the EU through the systematic use of norms. Consequently, the 
Commission would respond to the lack of observance of European norms in current and 
prospective member states by enacting narrower normative definitions of the core European 
principles and thus, extending its scope of intervention in its quality of guardian of European 
law. This work has tested these hypotheses against the cases of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, 
and verified the plausibility and consistency of the theory of Normative Empire with regards to 
the ongoing restructuring of these states’ judiciary under the guidance of the Commission. The 
redefined concept of Normative Empire along the main conclusions of this study can be summed 
up as following.      
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  The European Union is a Normative Empire composed of sovereign state units abiding to 
a set of common rules, the European norms. EU’s normative power is placed under the aegis of 
the European Commission that occupies the virtual top of the Empire. Power in the EU is 
diffused: it is shared between the European institutions and the member states and grows 
simultaneously from their interactions105. With regards to the European normative power, it is 
concentrated in the hands of the Commission. The EC is responsible for the protection of the 
founding treaties enshrining the core European principles and norms in the EU, and to a large 
extent for the formulation of new European norms by virtue of its ascendance on agenda-setting. 
In addition, the Commission has become the dominant player in accession negotiations and the 
main monitor of enlargement, increasing thus its capacity of supervision of the due application of 
European norms.  
 The Normative Empire is both inward and outward looking. The power capacity of norms 
is more visible during enlargement, the outward projection of the EU, than during the 
administration of the EU due to the resilience of the member states to accept the domination of 
the Commission. The implementation of norms comes up against state sovereignty. It has to be 
noted that the erosion of sovereignty is not the chief end of normative rule, but a mere 
consequence of the concentration of normative power in a single institution, and what is more, in 
which state sovereignty holds the least influence. Consequently, administration through norms is 
better carried out through the protection of the existing European norms, formally adopted with 
the ratification of the founding treaties by the states. The difficulties posed by state sovereignty 
separates European norms in two categories: structural and regulatory.  
 Structural norms result from the evolution of norms induced by previous enlargements. 
They were born through enlargement and serve enlargement. Customary enlargement law 
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expanded the scope of European norms and redefined core European principles, such as the Trias 
Politicas, into digestible legalistic normative sections such as the independence of the judiciary 
today. These new norms are absent from the treaties and belong to customary practice of pre-
accession negotiations. The purpose of structural norms aims at facilitating the complete 
embracement of the European founding norms by the acceding state. Structural norms carry the 
transformation of the state towards compatibility with the normative milieu of the EU.  
 Regulatory norms, conversely to their structural counterparts, do no bear any seed for 
change and aim at maintaining the status quo, the normative balance of the EU. Accession 
assumes the normative compatibility of the new member state; hence, post-accession 
administration aims at preventing any reverse of attitude and at supervising the observance of the 
European norms, as present in the treaties, amongst the member states.  
 Nevertheless, the distinction is not so well clear-cut in reality and enlargement has 
influenced the management of EU’s internal affairs, leading to the insertion of structural norms 
into European administration. Two examples demonstrate the effects of the expansion of 
enlargement-related norms onto the evolution and maturation of European normative power. The 
CVM studied in this research shows the transposition of conditionality and of subsequent 
structural norms to the sphere of administration, since Bulgaria and Romania have acceded to the 
status of member states in 2007. Both states undergo significant normative pressure from the 
Commission to implement structural norms, such as the independence of the judiciary, the fight 
against corruption or the respect of minorities’ rights. The task of administration is thus 
complicated by the protection of European norms in progress of being implemented. The 
mitigated results presented above highlight the clash between the necessity to transform the state 
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in accordance to European norms and the resilience of the states to surrender sovereignty after 
accession.  
The second example pertains to the maturation of European norms copying from 
structural norms adepts of breaking down European norms into narrower segments. The chain of 
reactions triggered by the Hungarian law on media placed the freedom of expression among the 
core European norms. However, no such freedom is explicitly present in the founding treaties 
despite its presence in most European constitutions. The core of European norms is thus 
expanding into sets of more comprehensible norms adapted to the reality of the facts. The 
regulatory role of the Commission augments accordingly and extends the EC’s zone of 
intervention to a greater array of cases.  
 A last important feature of the Normative Empire lies in the potential held by norms to 
facilitate European intervention in state governance. Norms allow the Commission, in particular, 
to infiltrate state affairs with regards to the application of European rules. Both the CVM and the 
Hungarian law demonstrate the increasing intervention of the EC in the state’s branches of 
power.    
 The CVM and the progress in Croatia have demonstrated this tendency of increase of the 
Commission’s aspirations and the influence of structural norms. The instrumentalisation of 
conditionality will have long-lasting effect on the management of European affairs, externally 
and internally due to the growing significance of norms in the EU-states relations. It resulted in 
the establishment of direct communications between the Commission and sub-states institutions, 
here judicial bodies. Such a dialogue is unconceivable in intergovermentalist opinions. Hence, 
norms are carrying the EC’s power forward and beyond state sovereignty, and foster the creation 
of normative European governance in other areas.   
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 Customary enlargement practice and the instrumentalisation of conditionality add to the 
definition of European membership and of the EU as a whole. They determine the intrinsic 
features, obligations and values that membership entails. Definition of ‘Europeanness’ reinforces 
the exclusivity of membership and to the consequent exclusion of normatively incompatible 
candidates. Moreover, the CVM holds the imperceptible meaning of a second class membership 
or a transitory phase towards full-fledged membership. Although Croatian authorities attempt to 
respond to the Commission’s demands in order to avoid similar fate as Bulgaria and Romania, 
the possibility is not completely dismissed.  
 
This research aimed at providing a reformulation of the concept of Normative Empire while 
resting on factual and contemporary evidence. The case of the independence of the judiciary in 
relation to the evolution of European norms reasserted the influence of norms in the EU, the 
evolution towards legalistic redefinitions of the founding treaties and the growing normative 
leverage of the Commission over internal European affairs. The determination of the EU to 
strengthen its normative foundations and internal normative harmony will certainly have positive 
consequences on its leverage at the international level. The EU needs to maintain its normative 
equilibrium in order to pose itself as the champion of norms for the rest of the world.  
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Annex:  
 
Table 1. Independence of the Judiciary in the CVM and Progress reports 
 
This is a working document, the following abbreviations stand for: 
Judi: Judiciary 
J: Judges 
P: Prosecutor 
JA: Judicial Act 
Corr: Corruption; AC: anti-corruption; HL corr: high level corruption 
CoI: Conflict of Interest 
MoJ: Ministry of Justice 
RoL: rule of law 
Appt: appointment; amdt: amendment; cmt: commitment; compet: competition; discip: 
disciplinary 
 
The sections highlighted for Croatia are topic referred to under the benchmarks of the CVM.  
A colour code was used in the original document to trace the recurrence of issues over time; the 
edited version however is in plain in order not to confuse the reader.  
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  Bulgaria Candidate Romania Candidate Bulgaria MS Romania MS Croatia 
  Issues Recommendatio
ns 
Achieve
ment 
Issues Recommend
ations 
achievemen
ts 
Issues Recommen
dations 
Achievement
s 
Issues Recommendati
ons 
Achievement
s 
Issues Recommend
ations 
Achievements 
2004  *new procedure 
code 
*revise JSA, 
Min of Interior 
act.  
 *appointment 
judicial 
assistants 
*appt 
President of 
courts (decide 
what judge on 
each affair) 
* Attends 
sessions SJC 
 
        *appointment 
Judicial trainees 
  
2005  *new procedure 
code 
*revise JSA, 
Min of Interior 
act. 
*curb organized 
crime 
  *Fight 
corruption 
*Board 
decides 
where 
judge will 
sit. 
*Action 
plan for 
revision of 
Judi.(guara
ntee 
independen
ce 
personnel 
and 
institutions) 
      *inefficiency of 
courts: 
proceedings too 
long 
*weakness in 
selecting judges 
*difficult to 
enforce 
judgments 
*backlog 
*reforms not 
implemented 
*appt President 
of courts 
*Pdt of 
supreme court 
appt by Plt 
upon proposal 
of President 
*appt judicial 
trainees 
*impartiality in 
war trials 
*improve 
Judicial 
system 
*case mgt 
*transparent 
recruitment 
and training 
*rationalizati
on of courts 
*financial 
capacity 
*administrati
ve capacity  
*financial 
support for 
Judicial 
Academy 
*impartiality 
of judges 
*reduce 
backlog 
*purchase new buildings 
*increased budget 
2006         Missing 
report 
  Missing 
Report 
*lack political 
will to 
investigate 
High Level 
corruption 
cases. 
*shortcomings 
in reforms  
*coordination 
of Anti-
Corruption 
programme 
*weak 
rationalization 
of court 
*backlog and 
added by state 
*enforcement 
*equipment in 
municipal 
courts 
*improve 
imposition 
of appt 
procedures, 
training and 
disciplinary 
sanction in 
Judiciary 
(determine 
entry in 
EU)  
*adopt code 
of ethics 
*structural changes and 
reduction of backlog 
Ministry 
of Justice 
2007        *follow up 
allegation 
of HL Corr 
*adopt 
pending 
*constitutiona
l amdt 
*inspectorate 
(all under 
BM1) 
  Missing 
report 
*little progress 
on 
accountability, 
imp, 
professionalizat
*more staff 
*more poli 
dedication 
*sanction in 
law  
*inspections continue, good 
results. [also in BM] 
*transfer of invest powers to P 
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JSA 
*demonstra
te results in 
AC 
*political 
commitme
nt to curb 
org. crime 
*strengthen 
all levels of 
Judi 
*MoJ no right 
to inspect 
arrangement 
in inst.  
ion, compet 
ition of Judi 
*backlog 
*weak 
rationalization 
of courts 
*corr in Judi 
*action plan for 
reform not 
enough detailed  
*unit for 
monitoring 
understaffed 
and no 
adjustment of 
measures 
And  CoI: 
more 
effective. 
2008       *not 
enough 
convincing 
results in 
reforms 
*no results 
in fight 
Corr 
*slow 
progress of 
cases in 
Judi and 
leaks of 
info 
*outdated 
penal code 
+no 
differentiat
ion in 
degrees of 
crime 
*contain 
CoI and 
influence 
*strengthen 
Adm 
&equipmen
t 
*establish 
SANS=AC 
agency 
*JSA 
(judicial 
system Act) 
*contradic
tion btn 
political 
and legal 
initiatives 
*uneven 
reforms by 
key inst 
*politicisat
ion of 
fight Vs 
corr 
*more comt 
from judicial 
inst 
*more 
administrative 
capacity in 
Judi 
 *weak 
administration 
*too few 
inspections 
*inexistent 
culture of 
political 
accountability 
*lack 
inspection at 
Prosecutor’s 
Office  
*only 5 part 
time inspectors 
*lack 
measurable 
objectives in 
new action plan 
*lack of 
ownership and 
responsibilityi n 
reforms 
*no IT 
directorate 
*+profession
alisation, 
accountabilit
y, 
competition 
needed 
*inspection=good results 
*implementation AC legal 
framework 
*revised action plan 
addressing major reform 
issues 
2009       *missing 
reform on 
Penal 
Code 
*decrease 
non 
partisan 
investigati
on; 
Killings 
continue 
and not 
apprehend
ed 
 
1st report 
*reform 
Penal code 
Procedure 
2nd report:  
*strategy 
Vs org 
crime and 
corr 
*ad hoc 
invest 
team: 
permanent 
*structure 
for 
prosecuting 
HL corr 
*efficient 
implementa
tion CoI 
law and 
reporting 
structure 
*monitor 
legislation 
Vs Corr 
and CoI 
 1st report 
*Plt Vs 
Gov 
*low 
political 
cmtmt 
*no 
uniform 
jusrisprude
nce 
*low 
accountabi
lity of Judi  
*shortcom
ing in 
staffing 
*step 
backward  
2nd report 
Despite 
political 
declaration 
*4 codes 
for 2011 
*low 
political 
comt to 
1st report 
*depoliticizatio
n 
*adopt 
codes(plt) 
*need 
progress by 
end 2009!! 
Capable of 
sanctioning 
corr and 
maintain RoL 
*adopt 
remaining laws 
to modernize 
system + 
independence 
and efficient 
implementatio
n 
*successful 
implementatio
n depends on 
financial 
resources, 
recruitment 
and allocation 
*new 
legislation 
*finalized 
amdnt to 
draft code 
Civil/crim 
codes 
+procedures 
*some 
reaction snce 
report 1 09 
*Min of interior 
and Judi 
involved in 
contract killings 
*no inspection 
of the P office 
*lack budget 
and ambition to 
rationalize 
court system 
*selection of J 
and P deficient, 
not transparent, 
uniform, 
objective 
criteria.  
*new amndt to 
court acts: MoJ 
interview in 
appt Pdt of 
courts 
*lack of 
monitoring and 
assessment of 
new measures 
*intimidation of 
police and P in 
*depoliticisa
tion: reduce 
role of 
executive 
and plt in 
appt 
*more 
accountabilit
y, 
independenc
e, 
professionali
sm and 
competition 
of Judi 
*reinforced the inspectorate 
with 20 part time inspectors 
*new legislation: judicial 
trainees, law on courts and 
misdeamour (for backlog) 
*better rationalisation of 
courts 
*proposal for opening a new 
school for Judi officials 
*reduction of backlog, but 
easy cases 
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and amend 
where 
necessary 
*freeze, 
confiscate 
criminal 
assets 
(better 
system) 
*strengthen 
inspectorat
es and 
encourage 
proactivity 
(mandate) 
*administra
tive 
arrangemen
ts for 
whistle 
blowers 
*redraft 
Penal code 
*implemen
t law 
*and Penal 
procedure 
codes more 
efficiently 
*objective 
assessment 
of 
performanc
e of J and 
objective 
criteria of 
appt of SJC 
*analyse 
and address 
contradicti
ons in 
disciplinary 
sanctions 
proceed by 
SJC 
*follow up 
on findings 
of 
inspectorat
e 
AC of staff 
2nd report 
Plt should 
support 
executive in 
judi reforms 
*careful that 
no 
unproductive 
amdt are added 
*more budget 
for human 
resources 
strategy 
!!! 
*get 4 codes 
adopted 
*depoliticisatio
n and cmt of 
parties 
*follow up on 
ANI 
*ensure 
efficiency in 
trial of HLcorr 
war crimes 
*corr in Public 
Procurement 
*unchanged 
penal 
immunity:lack 
of transparency 
and 
accountability 
*no inspection 
of P 
2010       1st report 
*poor 
results in 
investigati
on and 
prosecutio
n of 
HLcorr = 
more 
indictment
s , less 
prosecutio
n 
2nd report 
*judi 
process 
lacks 
1st report 
*improve 
judi 
practice= 
more 
proactive 
and 
responsibili
ty 
*need to 
follow up 
on 
Commissio
n concerns 
before next 
report 
(killings 
1st report 
*Penal code 
reformed 
upon 
recommendat
ions of 
Commission 
*proposal to 
amend JSA to 
give more 
disciplinary 
power to SJC 
2nd report 
*strong 
reform 
momentum= 
Reform of 
1st report 
*lost 
momentu
m of 
reforms 
*lack 
political 
Comt 
*delays in 
adopting 4 
codes 
2nd report 
*few 
results and 
low comt 
from 
political 
1st report 
* more 
coordination 
btn politics 
and 
Judi=priority 
*adopt the 4 
codes 
2nd report 
*Plt should be 
consistent in 
supporting 
efforts of Judi 
and executive 
*strengthen 
AC :political 
coordination 
 
2nd report 
*preparation 
of “Small 
Reform 
Law” and 
involvement 
of magi in 
process 
*too few results 
*backlog 
*difficult 
enforcement 
*inadequate 
infrastructure, 
and equipment 
of court and 
case system 
managment 
*criteria for J 
and P 
*no inspection 
in P 
*lack system 
evaluation of 
new legislation 
*SJC &SPC 
independent 
and 
accountable 
for effective 
self 
regulation 
*depoliticisa
tion 
*no longer appt by Pdt 
*end of 5years probation  for J 
*better organization of 
inspectorate 
Reorganisation of MoJ 
*amdt of Constitution :more 
independence of Judi 
*JA independent from MoJ 
*better procedure to select J 
and P 
*established School for Judi 
officials 
*reduction backlog 
*development check list for 
inspectorate 
*more political will to fight 
corr 
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initiative 
and 
profession
al capacity 
*shortcom
ings in 
preventing 
corr/CoI 
*inability 
to 
pronounce 
deterrent 
sanctions 
for serious 
crimes 
*few cases 
of CoI 
identified 
since 2008 
law 
*no 
effective 
procedure 
to detect 
CoI and 
communic
ate to P 
and corr in 
JSC) 
2nd report 
*amdt JSA 
should 
strengthen 
SJC 
!!! new 
Judi 
strategy, 
adopt 
changes 
JSA, strict 
sanction of 
corr and 
CoI 
*better 
practice Vs 
HL corr: 
from other 
MS, 
proactive 
investigatio
n strategy, 
investigate 
systematica
lly  links 
btn 
cases/org 
crimes/adm
inistrative 
authorities, 
protection 
of 
witnesses 
* POLI 
COMTMT 
penal 
procedures, 
seriously 
tackled org 
crime: 
indictments/s
evere 
sentences, 
reform of 
JSA 
-Joint team 
against 
financial 
offences Vs 
EU 
and Judi 
*new law 
Vs ANI 
and 
developme
nt 
*legal 
&legislatio
n 
loopholes 
for CoI 
on basis of 
impact 
assessment 
&protection Vs 
Fraud and CoI 
in procurement 
!!!!! 
* correct law 
in line w/h Ro 
cmt to 
EU=effective 
contribution of 
ANI to 
prevention and 
protection V 
corr, 
+dissuasive 
sanctions, 
correct 
procedural 
deficiencies in 
new laws, and 
promote role of 
ANI 
*monitor 
consistency 
and 
dissuasiveness 
of Vs corr 
sanctions, 
promote 
findings on 
individual 
penalties 
*evaluate 
impact of AC 
policies over 
last 2 y 
*evaluate 
effectiveness 
of legal 
framework of 
public 
procurement 
*consider 
prohibition for 
senior civil 
servants to 
benefit 
contracts in 
name of inst/ 
full 
transparency 
*establish 
performance 
Benchmarks 
for 
control/prevent 
activities, 
sanction CoI, 
&cooperation 
with Judi 
authorities 
1*performance 
review of Judi 
:reduce 
capacity 
*public doesn’t 
know about 
final execution 
of public 
procurement 
*revised action plan AC 
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imbalance 
2*transition to 
new SCM 
3*increase 
capacity of 
NIM: 
standards for 
all magistrates 
+ training 
4*revise HCCJ 
ad database 
5*reform 
disciplinary 
system and 
inspectorate 
focus on 
disciplinary 
sanctions, 
adapt sanctions 
6*correct ANI 
7*sanction HL 
corr 
8*strengthen 
AC policies 
10*evaluate 
authorities 
responsible for 
implementatio
n of public 
procurement 
2004                
2005                
2006                
2007             *not clear how 
breaches to 
Ethics will be 
punished 
*no Ethics code 
for P 
 *more power in appt Pdt of 
courts 
*framework criteria for 
performance J and help appt 
and disciplinary proceedings 
*2006 code of ethics 
*transfer of cases to reduce 
backlog 
*system transfer of J allowed 
but not in place 
2008               *new code of Ethics for 
attorneys 
*reduction of backlog 
Supreme 
Court 
2009          *cumberso
me 
procedures 
for appeals 
1st Report 
*must be a 
better guardian 
of 
jurisprudence 
2nd report 
*take into 
account 
findings of 
working 
groups on 
individuality of 
penalties for 
corr 
!!!!* follow up 
recommendatio
ns working 
groups 
*unify 
jurisprudence 
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*guidelines 
2010          1st report 
*no 
publicatio
n of court 
decisions 
*burdenso
me 
procedures 
for appeals 
in interest 
of law 
2nd report 
*guideline
s Vs Corr 
not really 
amended 
1st report 
*reform HCCJ 
*publish 
motivation for 
judgements 
*final version 
of guide should 
be more precie 
*no criteria for 
data 
protection/ 
consistency for 
types of 
decisions 
2nd reports 
!!!!* reduce 
competence to 
try cases in 1st 
instance,  
* more legal 
unification 
*publication of 
full 
jurisprudence 
of courts in 
accessible 
database 
*draft guide 
V Corruption 
 
  *Pdt more control on court 
management 
*improved publication/access 
to court decisions, dev of case 
law and public dissemination 
2004 *too many 
extraordin
ary appts 
+poli 
considerati
on 
              
2005    *budget under 
MoJ 
*low training 
of  Lawyers 
*competition 
not a success 
*competitio
n held to fill 
vacant 
position 
*transfer 
budget from 
MoJ to 
SCM 
*progress in 
school for 
clerks 
*reinforced 
secretariat 
*appt 
reform 
team 
*curricula 
improved 
and +tutors 
      *lack of 
objective, trans 
criteria of 
selection  for J, 
P 
*appt by PLT 
*Disciplinary 
proceeding 
launched by 
Courts Pdt and 
MoJ 
*consider 
compet 
&examinatio
n for 
entering Judi 
*transparent 
standard for 
J and 
trainees 
 
2006         *appt reform 
team for NIM 
   *lack trans of 
complain 
process for 
private parties 
*incapable 
Judges/poli 
considerations 
*lack trans, 
objective, 
uniform 
assessment of j 
and judicial 
trainees to enter 
profession 
*appt on 
written 
application 
*more 
impartiality 
*review 
selection 
criteria 
*accessible 
process 
complaint 
*review appt 
proc of Pdt 
of courts and 
Judi trainees 
by MoJ 
*disciplinary Council 
*better selection criteria 
*Judicial inspection  
SJC/SMC 
2007       *missing 
training at 
NIM for 
appt 
*establish 
Judi 
inspectorat
e under 
*fired corr P 
*Judges from 
practicing 
lawyers 
*Only 
partial 
implement
ation of 
  *lack of 
objective, 
transparent 
criteria of 
 *possibility to interview 
applicants for J 
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*no 
competitio
n for 
promotion 
J,P, I 
 
pending 
JSA 
*independe
nce staffing 
of 
inspectorat
e 
*progress 
in 
recruitment 
procedure 
measures 
of SCM 
*fast track 
recruitmen
t 
procedure, 
less 
quality, 
concerns 
selection  for J, 
P 
*impossibility 
to interview all 
candidates 
2008       *no 
convincing 
results 
*take 
responsibili
ty in 
reform 
process 
*contain 
CoI 
*publish 
complaint 
on 
appt/promo
tion 
  *must take 
position Vs 
corr 
disregarding 
political 
debate.  
*budget 
reinforced 
*lack of 
objective, 
transparent 
criteria of 
selection  for J, 
P- diff to 
interview 
candidates 
*disciplinary 
proceedings 
only by courts 
Pdt and MoJ 
*quota in 5 y 
probation 
period 
 *reinforced and more budget 
*imp SJC to select J (amdt on 
Acts) 
*evaluation of J’s work  
2009        *follow up 
on 
inspectorat
e 
*many 
prosecution 
but ad hoc 
*inspectorate 
operational 
1st report 
*translate 
intentions 
into deeds 
*transpare
ncy and 
account 
*not 
appropriat
e HR 
emergency 
measures= 
staff 
shortage 
2nd report 
*need 
money for 
human 
resources 
strategy 
1st report 
*reallocation 
of staff btn 
courts to 
counter 
pressing 
shortfalls 
*publication of 
judgements on 
e 
*deeper 
investigation 
(including  P 
office) 
2nd report 
*need 
reorganisation 
of  P office, 
because 
shortage in P 
!!! 
* implement 
flexible 
priority driven 
HR strategy 
=transfer btn 
court levels/ 
transfer 
administrative 
tasks to 
auxiliary 
staffs/develop 
personnel 
schemes: 
forecasts of 
appt/retirement
/transfers 
*transparency/
accountability  
of SCM: 
especially 
*general 
inspection of 
judi bodies 
*new HR 
strat 
*appt and 
compet 
procedures in 
line with obj 
& 
qualification
*good track 
record of 
inspectorate 
& incr discip 
proceedings 
Vs 
magistrates 
*lack of 
objective, 
transparent 
criteria of 
selection  for J, 
P 
*insufficient 
administrative 
capacity 
*review appt 
procedure=li
mit poli 
influence in 
SJC and 
SPC  
*new law on trainees= bar 
exam, and practice 
*disciplinary  proceedings 
continue 
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council 
responsible for 
promotion/appt
: publish 
reasoned 
decision + 
:accessibility 
2010       *few 
results in 
high level 
corr 
*sanctions 
too lenient 
*corr in 
SJC 
officials 
*results of 
inspectorat
e not 
followed 
up 
*sanctions 
too lenient 
*delays in 
cases 
*lacked 
legal basis 
for 
disciplinar
y 
proceeding
s 
*improve 
selection 
procedures, 
create 
career 
incentives 
and appt 
procedures 
*amdt 
should 
strengthen 
SJC: 
prepare 
annual 
analysis of 
workload, 
rebalance 
personnel, 
open/close 
court on 
basis of 
workload,  
+transparen
t in appt 
*+more 
accountabil
ity :open 
vote and 
detailed 
reasoning 
of decision 
*all 
disciplinary 
powers to 
SJC 
*show 
more 
initiatives 
after amdt 
JSA 
*good results 
*joint 
working 
group btn 
SJC and 
inspectorate : 
unify 
jurisprudence 
and into appt 
*measures Vs 
corr in SJ C 
*Inspectorate 
identified 
weaknesses + 
recommendat
ions to head 
of courts 
1st report 
*no 
application 
of 
Commissi
on’s HR 
recommen
dations 
net staff 
losses 
no 
results in 
rebalancin
g staff 
*unconvin
cing 
results in 
disciplinar
y 
proceeding
s: leniency 
*new 
inspection 
challenged 
by P:0 
objectivity 
2nd report 
*shortcom
ing in 
discip 
proceeding 
*no 
application 
of Comm 
recomm 
for HR or 
new 
measures 
1st report 
*smooth 
transition to 
new council 
*review 
guidelines for 
inspection 
*increase 
capacity for 
judicial 
inspection and 
focus on discip 
cases 
2nd Report !!!!! 
*structural HR 
adjustments 
:transfer 
magistrates, 
reduce 
capacity 
imbalances, fill 
vacant position 
*transition to 
new council 
*reorganise 
disciplinary 
system=approp
riate sanctions, 
consistent, 
dissuasive, 
proposition; 
annual 
evaluation of 
Judi 
1st report 
*pilot 
analysis to 
rebalance 
workload 
*revised 
recruitment 
procedures of 
inspectorate 
*comt to 
publish all 
court 
decisions 
2nd report 
*increase 
yearly intake 
from NIM 
(with 5 y 
practice) 
* lack of 
objective, 
transparent 
criteria of 
selection  for J, 
P  
*insufficient 
capacity 
*transparency 
of disciplinary 
proceedings 
*oral exams 
vague.  
*0proceeding 
by SPC 
*careful 
mgmt of 2 
election 
procedures 
(SJC and 
JA) 
*better selection of J andP, 
based on school of  judi 
officials (under JA) 
And written and oral exams 
*appt Pdt of Courts 
*candidates for J&P:exam to 
enter school for officials  (2y 
initial training and exam) 
*+ more transparent 
methodology for local judi 
councils to evaluate J for 
promotion 
2004    *power for 
extraordinary 
appeal 
 *lost power 
for 
extraordina
ry appeal 
         
2005 *10% 
vacancies 
*no step 
modernisi
ng P. 
*investigat
ed less 
cases in 
HL corr 
*more 
transparent and 
accountable  
   *can only 
allocate 
cases 
according 
to defined 
criteria 
*no 
interventio
n in lower 
P 
         
2006                
Prosecuto
r Office 
2007             *2MPs in SPC 
*does not 
employ 
USKOK for 
high level corr 
 *more objective criteria of 
state P and internal 
supervision 
*investigative power in 
criminal proceedings 
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2008               *obligation to report annually 
on disciplinary  proceedings v 
P 
2009        *follow up 
on 
inspectorat
e and take 
corrective 
measures 
*new team on 
EU fraud, org 
crime, corr 
and money 
laundering at 
Supre Cass P 
Office 
*lack of P 
to ensure 
duties 
*review 
guidelines to 
recruit 
inspectors 
*manual of 
best practices 
*results in 
lower courts 
to counter 
corr 
 
*intimidation of 
P 
*few 
prosecution of 
HL corr 
 *investigative capacity in 
Organised crime and Corr 
2010       1st report 
*lack 
account 
Chief P 
*deficienci
es in P 
*no 
effective 
detection 
of CoI 
2nd report 
*deficienci
es in P 
*reluctanc
e to start 
invest 
despite 
obvious 
signs:rare 
application 
of search 
warrants 
(cases of 
fraud) 
1st report 
*improve P 
office 
2nd report 
!!! 
*improve 
practice 
thru 
detailed 
analysis of 
shortcomin
gs, manual 
of best 
practices, 
training 
programme
s, syst 
supervision 
of courts 
and P 
offices 
*5 
investigative 
teams vs corr 
and high 
profile cases 
  *results in 
the country 
more 
indictments 
Vs officials 
*lack 
disciplinary 
proceed in P 
*strengthen 
prosecution 
of money 
laundering 
 
2004                
2005                
2006                
2007                
2008          *not 
operationa
l 
*demonstrate 
operational 
capacities to 
sanction unjust 
assets, 
incompatibiliti
es, CoI 
*legal 
framework 
*director 
resigned 
*limited staff 
*misunderstand 
CoI 
*limited staff 
*limited invest 
and proceeding 
  
2009          *ambiguo
us legal 
situation 
*keep up with 
good results 
*need to invest 
in logistics, 
equipment, 
case mngt 
software, HR 
!!*continue 
track record of 
assets 
*good results 
in following 
results 
*reached 
staff goals 
*fine for 
missing 
declaration/c
ourt case 
*no progress in 
preventing CoI 
*CoI within 
very structure 
*need admin 
support 
*CoI further 
explained 
 
Integrity 
Agency 
2010        *establish 
an integrity 
Agency 
 *IT still to 
be fully 
implemen
ted 
*law on 
ANI 
unconstit
utional= 
threat to 
ANI 
*make new 
law for ANI in 
order to keep 
performing 
duty of control 
organ 
*good results 
*recognized 
by P 
*weak 
supervision of 
the law 
*lack oversight 
trans n public 
procurement 
*CoI 
misunderstood 
 *restructured so less influence 
from the PLT 
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2004          
 
     
2005      *Director 
and 3 Dep 
dismissed 
      *lack personnel *improve 
administrativ
e capacity 
*act for cooperation with 
police  
*action plan prevent and 
combat corr in enforcement 
agencies 
2006             *too few results 
*uniform 
application of 
law 
*cases not 
followed up 
 *strengthened 
2007               *mandate for abuse of office  
*declaration of assets for J and 
P 
2008       *under 
Council of 
ministers 
 *+competenci
es in invest 
HL corr ad 
org crime 
  *investigatio
n Vs P 
*good track 
record 
*invest Vs a 
former Min 
*reactive law 
enforcement 
and not 
proactive 
 
*efforts in 
tackling HL 
corr in 
public 
procurement 
*more active 
2009       *decrease 
in non-
partisan 
investigati
ons 
  *PLT 
blocks 
investigati
ons 
*lengthy 
trials, 
leniency 
of courts, 
inconsiste
ncy of 
jurisprude
nce 
 *good results 
BUT 
*poli influence  *follow up 
prosecution 
*more 
compet in 
invest Fraud, 
public 
procurement 
*more proactive and invest of 
HL corr 
Anti-
Corruptio
n Agency 
2010       *plan still 
to be 
implement
ed 
*strengthen 
inspectorat
e 
*ambitious 09 
National  AC 
strategy 
*delays in 
HL corr 
trials, 
inconst/len
iency in 
penalties 
(courts), 
not 
dissuavive 
enough 
*asks for 
convincing 
results 
*results to be 
followed up 
*increase of 
final 
convictions 
and high 
profile but 
still low 
*unchanged 
budget 
*lack track 
record of 
effective invest 
8unsuffi 
scrutiny 
  
*improve 
checks on 
accuracy of 
declaration 
of assets of J 
and P 
*strengthen 
prosecution 
of $ 
laundering 
*handles more cases 
2004                Judicial 
Academy 2005 *under the 
MoJ 
*rely on 
foreign 
donors 
*training 
on ad hoc 
basis 
 
*more training 
and 
specialization 
*training for 
lawyer 
 *rely on 
foreign donors 
*progress in 
school for 
clerks 
*curricula 
improved 
and more 
tutors 
      *not fully 
operational: too 
few mentors, 
and premises 
*training now 
only by courts 
and P offices: 
no framework 
of supervision 
*continue 
funding  
*preserve 
indep of 
academy 
*more 
specific 
training on 
eco crimes 
money 
laundering, 
corr 
*on the job 
training for 
trainees 
jandP 
*objective, 
uniform 
system of 
ongoing 
professional  
evaluation 
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:efficiency 
/competition
-career adv 
2006              *improve 
staffing  
*funding 
*move away 
from ad hoc 
curri to 
medium/lon
g term 
*train 
systematicall
y and 
regularly all 
strata, J, P, 
Ad, court 
staff 
 
2007        *training 
on new 
procedural 
codes 
    *no multi 
annual curricula 
designed 
*no progress on 
pre service 
training 
*decrease 
budget 
*no full time 
director 
 *senior advisory board :direct 
and training 
*programme committee 
2008             *lack staff 
*lack adequate 
permises 
 *full time director 
*increased budget 
*adaptation of training to EU 
leis 
2009             *understaffed 
*lack 
permanent 
premises 
*inadequate 
budget 
*initial training 
for J&P 
 *in service training 
*initial training fro jdui 
traineed and advisers 
2010        *need to 
improve 
curricula 
&legal 
training, 
change 
appraisal 
system 
  !!!*increase 
capacity for 
initial 
continuous 
training 
*consistent 
professional 
standards for 
magistrates 
*yearly 
projection of 
recruitments 
&training 
needs 
   *independence from MoJ 
*own budget and staff 
*permanent premises and 
renovation 
*prof training programmes 
and initial trainings  and on Eu 
law 
*establish school for Judi 
officials 
2004                
2005      *3 law 
package: 
independen
ce  
personnel 
&institutio
ns 
         
2006                
Security 
of Tenure 
2007         *immunity 
only during 
official duties 
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2008                
2009                
2010                
2004                
2005 *budgetno
t enough 
 increased *salaries not 
increased 
           
2006                
2007                
2008                
2009                
Financial 
Security 
2010                
Administr
ation  
2005   N 
problem 
with 
understaff
ing 
      09 *low 
staffing 
  05*insufficient 
administration 
*too many 
judges and too 
few P 
  
IT 2005    *limited 
access to Pc 
           
 2007       *limited 
computeris
ation 
  09=limited 
access to 
IT 
8IT tool 
needed 
  06*imp IT  
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Table 2. Legal Vs Political and European Vs Domestic discourse 
This working document however does not quote literally the reports and was used in order to keep a clear thread of thought during the 
analysis of the reports.  
 
  Bulgaria Candidate Romania Candidate Bulgaria MS Romania MS Croatia 
2004           
2005           
2007    Govs 
should 
carry 
reforms 
Mostly legal 
arg-
recommendati
ons all about 
the 
functionality 
of judi 
     
Legal Vs 
Political 
argument
s 
2009      1)But 
political bc 
call for 
functioning 
Judi+ calls 
upon BG to 
reform.  
2)refer to plt 
blocking 
legislation on 
confiscating 
assets 
-critique 
legislation 
and points out 
contradictions 
between 
government 
attitude and 
legislature 
with the 
objectives set 
-CVM a tool 
not an end in 
itself- cannot 
replace BG 
commitment. 
To Eu 
standards 
- 
recommendati
on= 
initiatives not 
backed up by 
1)Legal matter 
2) legal orientation 
of CVM 
- successful 
initiative on 
technical side 
 Recomm= half 
legal and half poli 
1)Call for 
political 
agreement on 
drafts CC 
-call for poli 
cooperation 
with ANI 
-call for plt to 
let DNA 
alone, and 
initiative 
from plt to 
change  
nomination 
chief P=  
challenge 
system 
2) call on 
gov: 
condemn 
unequivocal 
commitment 
of poli 
parties. And 
plt to be more 
consistent and 
committed to 
fight HL corr 
-Special 
recommendati
on to plt 
And call for 
depoliticisatio
n 
-call on 
executive 
and plt to 
hold back 
to their 
place 
Focus on legal 
arguments, 
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political 
support 
- call on 
legislature 
and 
involvement 
of 
legislative/ex
ecutive 
Call for poli 
commitment 
-more 
commitment 
from Judi 
-condemn  
contradictory 
legislation 
from 
executive 
 
2010     1)comm. 
Influences 
internal 
politics on 
Judicial appt 
2) strong 
political will , 
applauded 
moves by gov 
2) mostly 
legal 
recommendati
ons 
2) condemn lack of 
poli will and 
reluctance of judi to 
take part in reforms 
-poli arg especially 
concerning the law 
on ANI 
-call for poli support 
for the reforms 
And insertion in judi 
‘s politics 
-cooperation btn 
Judi and Polical 
spheres 
1)legal 
instructions 
and 
explanation 
of 
consequences 
of legislation 
 Legal arg 
European 
Vs 
Domestic 
arg 
2004 European arg: 
Independence  
of Judi action 
needs to be 
pursued as 
guarantee of 
RoL  
Copenhagen 
criteria 
Judi 
assista
nt to 
other 
courts 
too 
-
premis
es 
prevent
ing 
public 
access 
and 
Journal
ists 
Prevale
Rule of 
Law  
     No major 
distinctio
n 
between 
domestic  
and 
european 
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nce of 
arg 
about 
efficien
cy, few 
about 
accessi
on 
2005  -
increas
e 
accoun
tability 
of Judi 
and 
trust of 
citizens 
      Functioni
ng of 
Judi a 
challenge 
for C 
 
2007           
2009     CVM a tool 
for improving 
BG—to be 
more 
European, to 
be  a better 
member plus 
taken up in 
Schengen 
debate 
-procedure Vs 
org crime 
sends 
message to 
public 
-need public 
trust 
 
CVM 
European 
decision- 
emphasize 
benefit for 
BG but 
mostly bc 
Commission 
highlighted 
issue 
-align with 
EU practices 
and standards 
Rom needs to 
demonstrate 
functioning Judi: to 
whom if not EU 
Changes not 
visible for 
public 
  
2010     -step up fight 
vs HL corr- 
consider MS 
best practice 
– as in adapt 
to EU’s best 
practice 
 Com to EU 
undermined by ANI 
law 
Independence 
Judiciary-
good for 
public 
finances and 
economic and 
social  
development 
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